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Abstract
We study how professional players and college students play zero-sum two-
person strategic games in a laboratory setting. We ﬁrst ask professionals to
play a 2x2 game that is formally identical to a strategic interaction situation
that they face in their natural environment. We ﬁnd that these subjects play
in the laboratory exactly as in the ﬁeld, that is as the equilibrium of the game
dictates: (i) their distribution of play is statistically no diﬀerent from the equi-
librium distribution, and (ii) they generate sequences of choices that are serially
independent. In sharp contrast with them, however, we also ﬁnd that college
students play the game far from the equilibrium predictions. We then study
the behavior of professional players and college students in the classic O’Neill’s
4x4 zero-sum game, a game that none of the subjects have encountered pre-
viously, and ﬁn dt h es a m ed r a s t i cd i ﬀerences in behavior between these two
subject pools. The transfer of skills and experience from the familiar ﬁeld to
the unfamiliar laboratory observed for professional players is relevant, from
a methodological perspective, to evaluate the circumstances under which be-
havior in a laboratory setting may be a reliable indicator of behavior in a
naturally occurring setting. From a cognitive perspective, it is useful for re-
search on recognition processes, intuition, and similarity as a basis for inductive
reasoning.
∗We thank Jose Apesteguia, Pedro Dal B´ o, Vicki Bogan, Juan Carrillo, the late Jean Jacques
Laﬀont, Bradley Ruﬄe, Ana I. Saracho, Jesse Shapiro, and audiences at various seminars for helpful
comments and suggestions. We are especially grateful to the general managers of the soccer clubs
that granted access to the players that participated in this study, and to the Universidad del Pa´ ıs
Vasco for its hospitality. We gratefully acknowledge generous ﬁnancial support from the Salomon
Foundation and the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnolog´ ıa (grant BEC2003-08182). Pedro Dal
B´ o provided the dice. Data and programs are available upon request. Any errors are our own.
†Brown University. Email: ipalacios@brown.edu.
‡Iowa State University and Ben-Gurion University. Email: oscar@volij.co.il“We transfer our experience in past instances to objects
which are resembling, but are not exactly the same with
those concerning which we have had experience. ... Tho’
the habit loses somewhat of its force by every diﬀerence,
yet’tis seldom entirely destroy’d, where any considerable
circumstances remain the same.”
David Hume, AT r e a t i s eo fH u m a nN a t u r e(1739)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over the last two decades experiments in laboratory environments have become an
important tool in empirical economic analysis, as insights into behavior that cannot
be studied easily in the real world may be obtained in this controlled and artiﬁcial
setting. Thus, an important question for those areas of economic research that rely
on data collected in a laboratory is how applicable are these insights for predicting
behavior in natural environments.
This paper addresses this question for situations that involve strategic interac-
tion. Game theory is, in fact, one of the areas where it is mainly experimental data
collected in the laboratory, rather than in natural environments, that are used to
inform theoretical developments.1 One reason for this is that Nature does not always
create the circumstances that allow a clear view of the principles at work in strategic
situations. Furthermore, naturally occurring phenomena are typically too complex
to be empirically tractable.
Laboratory environments provide valuable control of players’ information, payoﬀs,
available strategies and other relevant aspects, which is important because game-
theoretic predictions are often sensitive to changes in these variables. However, as
Harrison and List (2004, pp. 1009-11) remark, “lab experiments in isolation are nec-
essarily limited in relevance for predicting ﬁeld behavior, unless one wants to insist a
priori that those aspects of economic behavior under study are perfectly general ...
[The reason is that] the very control that deﬁnes the experiment may be putting the
s u b j e c to na na r t i ﬁc i a lm a r g i n .E v e ni fb e h a v i o ro nt h a tm a r g i ni sn o td i ﬀerent than
it would otherwise be without the control, there is the possibility that constraints on
one margin may induce eﬀects on behavior on unconstrained margins.” These and
other doubts about the generalizability and extent to which laboratory results may
provide insights into ﬁeld behavior, demand more elaborate experiments.2
1Camerer (2003) oﬀers a comprehensive review.
2See Harrison (2005), Weibull (2004) and Lazear, Malmendier and Weber (2005) for other con-
cerns, and Camerer (2003), Harrison and List (2004), and Kagel and Roth (1995) for relevant
references on the development of diﬀerent experiments.
1This paper is concerned with one such experiment. In particular, we conduct
a conventional experiment with a non-standard subject pool playing a game where
players are predicted to choose probabilistic mixtures. Our idea is to take advantage
of the opportunity that professional soccer provides in order to develop an “arte-
factual ﬁeld experiment” to study a margin not studied previously for games with
mixed-strategy equilibria.3 The suitable circumstances this sport oﬀers are the fol-
lowing: (i) Professional soccer players face a simple strategic game that is governed
by very detailed rules: a penalty kick; (ii) The formal structure of this game can
be reproduced in the laboratory; (iii) Previous research has found that when profes-
sional soccer players play this game in the ﬁe l d ,t h e i rb e h a v i o ri sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h e
equilibrium predictions of the theory. These three distinct characteristics allow us to
study whether the skills and heuristics that players may have developed in a familiar
ﬁeld setting transfer to the unfamiliar laboratory, and the extent to which ﬁeld and
laboratory behavior are diﬀerent. Put diﬀerently, they allow to study, for the ﬁrst
time to the best of our knowledge, the role of laboratory context as a “treatment” in
a strategic interaction situation requiring use of mixed strategies. A positive answer
to the question of whether ﬁeld and laboratory behavior are suﬃciently similar may
then indicate that laboratory ﬁndings are reliable for predicting ﬁeld behavior. A
negative answer would suggest the opposite.
We proceed as follows. We ﬁrst analyze the behavior of professional soccer players
in a laboratory setting playing a simultaneous two-person zero-sum 2x2 game that
is formally identical to a penalty kick. The equilibrium of the game is unique and
requires each player to use a mixed strategy. The procedure we follow makes no ref-
erences to any type of soccer terminology that may trigger psychological motivations,
a n dw eu s em u c hl o w e rs t a k e st h a ni nr e a ll i f e. To test our methodological hypothesis,
we also implement exactly the same controlled laboratory experiment with subjects
drawn from the standard subject pool of college students with no soccer experience.
Palacios-Huerta (2003) found that the behavior of professional players in the soc-
cer ﬁeld was consistent with equilibrium play in every testable respect: (i) their
winning probabilities were statistically identical across strategies; (ii) their choices
were serially independent.4 The results we obtain in this paper can be summarized
as follows. We ﬁnd that professional players continue to behave remarkably consistent
with the implications of equilibrium in this entirely diﬀerent setting. Interestingly,
we also ﬁnd that their behavior is in sharp contrast with that of college students
who play quite poorly from the perspective of the equilibrium of the game: they do
not to equate winning probabilities across strategies and consistently generate se-
quences that exhibit negative autocorrelation. We interpret these results as evidence
that professionals transfer their learning across these vastly diﬀerent environments
3This term follows the classiﬁcation suggested in Harrison and List (2004).
4See also Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose (2002) and Azar and Bar-Eli (2005) for further evi-
dence in support of equilibrium behavior.
2and circumstances. As such, the nature of the subject pool is important for drawing
inferences about the predictive power of the equilibrium of the game.
These results may be of special interest in the context of understanding the de-
terminants of randomization, which is a testable hypothesis shared by every game
that admits a mixed strategy equilibrium. An extensive literature in experimental
economics, game theory, and psychology consistently ﬁnds that subjects are unable to
generate i.i.d. sequences in the laboratory. Instead, they tend to exhibit a signiﬁcant
bias against repeating the same choice.5 We ﬁnd, however, that professional soccer
players do generate perfectly random sequences in the laboratory whereas, consistent
with the extensive evidence available in the literature, college students do not.
In an attempt to evaluate whether professional players may behave diﬀerently in
a game they have not encountered previously in any setting, we ask them to play
the 4x4 zero-sum two-person simultaneous game developed in O’Neill (1987), and
further studied in Brown and Rosenthal (1990), Shachat (2002) and Walker and
Wooders (2001). We again compare their behavior with that of college students. The
results show that students behave as previous authors have found, that is far from
the predictions of the unique equilibrium of the game. Although we use much greater
monetary incentives and subjects play more repetitions than in previous studies of
this game, students do not equate winning probabilities across strategies and continue
generating sequences of choices that are not random. In sharp contrast with this
behavior, we ﬁnd that professional soccer players play, again, remarkably consistent
with equilibrium: (i) their distribution of play is not statistically diﬀerent from the
equilibrium distribution, and (ii) their choices are serially independent.
We interpret the results that professionals who play a given strategic game in
a ﬁeld setting according to its equilibrium predictions continue to behave as the
equilibrium predicts in the laboratory, under lower monetary stakes than in real
life, and even when facing an unfamiliar game, as supporting the idea that the vast
diﬀerences in environments do not undermine the skills these subjects use in the ﬁeld.
The fact that the behavior of professional soccer players is distinctly diﬀerent from
that of college students, the subject pool typically considered in a large experimental
literature, suggests that the game-theoretic equilibrium predictions may have greater
empirical content than previously considered for explaining behavior in both natural
and experimental settings. It also suggests that in these games the nature of the
subject pool may be a critical ingredient of the laboratory experiment for predicting
ﬁeld behavior.
From a methodological viewpoint, we see the artefactual ﬁeld experiments imple-
mented in this paper as being complementary to traditional laboratory experiments
of games where players are predicted to choose probability mixtures. While per-
fectively competitive games do not represent the entire universe of strategic games
5See Neuringer (2002) and Camerer (1995) for surveys of the relevant literature.
3involving mixed strategies, a number of authors consider that two-person zero-sum
games are the “vital cornerstone” and the “heartland” of game theory (e.g., Aumann
(1987), Binmore et al, 2001). Indeed, Von Neumann’s (1928) theory can be regarded
as the branch of game theory with the most solid theoretical foundations.6 From this
perspective, the positive results we ﬁnd lend support to a fundamental result of game
theory in a setting where the small number of existing results were mainly negative.
These results have implications for the literature on cognition and similarity as
a basis for inductive reasoning.7 Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005) review
evidence showing how “with experience at a task or a problem, the brain seems
to gradually shift processing toward brain regions and specialized systems that can
solve problems automatically and eﬃciently with low eﬀort.” Similarly, Smith (2005)
considers that “human activity is diﬀused and dominated by unconscious, autonomic,
neuropsychological systems that enable people to function eﬀectively without always
calling upon the brain’s scarcest resource—attention and reasoning circuitry.” He also
discusses evidence showing how the challenge of any unfamiliar action or problem
appears ﬁr s tt ot r i g g e ras e a r c hi nt h eb r a i nt ob ring to the conscious mind what one
knows that is related to the decision context, and how systems built into the brain
do their work automatically and largely outside of our conscious awareness.8
From this viewpoint, the results in this paper support the hypothesis that cog-
nitive skills may exist beyond those that subjects are aware of, and that these skills
are the outcome of learning over an extended period of time in a ﬁeld setting. The
facts that they exist in the context of strategic interaction situations involving mixed
strategies, and that they transfer to a highly unfamiliar environment where data to
inform economic theories are often obtained, are the main ﬁndings of our analysis.
2 Experimental Procedures
We implement two diﬀerent zero-sum games, each one with two subject pools: pro-
fessional soccer players and college students. The experiments were conducted during
the period November 2003-October 2004. Each of the two zero-sum games we study
was played by a diﬀerent set of 40 professional soccer players working in twenty pairs
and 40 college students with no soccer experience working in twenty pairs. We also
6Within the class of zero-sum games even the less stringent concept of correlated equilibrium
coincides with the set of minimax strategies. In this sense, the theory of Minimax can be regarded
as one of the less controversial ones from the theoretical point of view.
7See, for instance, Hume (1748), Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001), Gigerenzer and Todd (1999),
Selten (1998), Simon (1983), and other references therein.
8These ideas are also supported in Gneezy, Rustichini and Vostruknutov (2005) who study experi-
mentally how human subjects solve a complex problem, and ﬁnd that processes involving unconscious
reasoning are active in the solution of sophisticated and novel problems.
4recruited two additional sets of 40 college students with soccer experience at the am-
ateur level, one for each of the two games, to consider one of the extensions of the
analysis that will be discussed later.
Next we provide details about the recruiting process for these 240 subjects and
other aspects of the experimental procedure, and then describe the experimental
designs of the two games we study.
2.1 Subjects
Each subject served in only one type of game and one session, and those who knew
each other were not allowed to participate in the same pair. Sessions lasted about an
hour, and subjects received their winnings as payment.
Professional Players. These subjects were recruited from professional soccer
clubs in Spain. Professional soccer teams play most of their games in domestic league
competitions. As in many other European and South American countries, league
competition in Spain is hierarchical. It has three professional divisions: Primera
Division with 20 teams, Segunda Division A with 22 teams, and Segunda Division B
with 80 teams divided into four groups of twenty teams each.9 Our subjects come from
a number of clubs in the north of Spain, a region with a high density of professional
teams. For example, within 150 miles of the city of Bilbao, there are 25 professional
soccer clubs participating in league competitions in those three divisions. Teams
typically have about 22-26 players in their roster, 2-4 of which are goalkeepers.
Eighty male soccer players (40 kickers and 40 goalkeepers) were recruited from
these teams with telephone calls and visiting teams in daily practices.10 Marca (2005)
oﬀers a vitae of every player in Primera Division and Segunda Division A that includes
personal information, professional playing history and other records. Forty kicker-
goalkeeper pairs were formed randomly using the last two digits of their national
ID card with the only requirement that subjects who were currently playing or had
played in the past for the same team were not allowed to participate in the same pair.
Undergraduate students. One hundred and sixty male subjects were re-
cruited with ﬂiers around the campus of the Universidad del Pa´ ıs Vasco in Bilbao,
and by visiting diﬀerent undergraduate classes. We recruited no subjects majoring in
Economics or Mathematics. Half of the subjects we recruited had no soccer experi-
ence. The other half had soccer experience at the amateur level as they were required
9The next division in the hierarchy, Tercera Division, also includes some players who are profes-
sional in that their salaries plus bonuses are similar to the average household salary in Spain. There
are 240 teams in Tercera Division in Spain, sorted regionally according to geographical distance into
twelve groups of twenty teams each. Teams in divisions lower in the hierarchy, playing in “regional
leagues,” do not typically have any professional players. Our sample of amateur players comes from
Tercera Division and these regional leagues.
10No player that had played professionally for less than two years at the time of the experiment
was recruited.
5that they should be currently participating in regular league competitions in regional
amateur divisions, that is Tercera Division and below. These leagues follow exactly
the same structure, calendar schedule, and are governed by the same rules (FIFA,
2005) as the professional leagues.
Pairs were formed randomly using the last two digits of their national ID card.
For subjects with soccer experience, those that were currently playing or had previ-
ously played for the same team were not allowed to participate in the same pair.
2.2 Experimental Designs
2.2.1 Experiment 1: Penalty Kick
Before discussing how the formal structure of a penalty kick may be reproduced in a
laboratory setting, it is ﬁrst useful to go over its basic rules and structure, and the
evidence from the ﬁeld.
In soccer, a penalty kick is awarded against a team which commits one of the ten
punishable oﬀenses inside its own penalty area while the ball is in play. The world
governing body of this sport, the F´ ed´ eration Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA), describes in detail the simple rules that govern this strategic interaction
situation in the Oﬃcial Laws of the Game (FIFA, 2005):11
• “The ball is placed on the penalty mark in the penalty area.
• The player taking the penalty kick is properly identiﬁed.
• The defending goalkeeper remains on the goal line, facing the kicker, between
the goalposts, until the ball has been kicked.
• The player taking the penalty kicks the ball forward.
• He does not play the ball a second time until it has touched another player.
• A goal may be scored directly from a penalty kick.”
Each penalty kick involves two players: a kicker and a goalkeeper. In the typi-
cal kick the ball takes about 0.3 seconds to travel the distance between the penalty
mark and the goal line; that is, it takes less than the reaction time plus goalkeeper’s
movement time to any possible path of the ball.12 Hence, both kicker and goalkeeper
must move simultaneously. The penalty kick has only two possible outcomes: score
or no score, actions are observable, and the outcome of the penalty kick is decided
almost immediately after players choose their strategies.13
11The dimensions of the ﬁeld of play, including the penalty area, the position of the penalty mark,
and the distance to the goals, are described in detail in Law 1 of FIFA (2005).
12Miller (1998) reports evidence on ball speed, reaction times, and movement times from all the
penalty kicks in four World Cups.
13The spin of the kick plays no role. There are no second penalties in case a goal is not scored.
The initial location of both the ball and the goalkeeper is always the same: the ball is placed on the
penalty mark and the goalkeeper positions himself on the goal line, equidistant to the goalposts.
6The clarity and simplicity of the rules and structure of this simultaneous one-shot
interaction suggest not only that it can be studied empirically, but also that it may
be easily reproduced in an artiﬁcial setting such as a laboratory. The basic structure





πLL,1 − πLL πLR,1 − πLR
πRL,1 − πRL πRR,1 − πRR
,
where πij denotes the kicker’s probabilities of scoring when he chooses i and the
goalkeeper chooses j,f o ri,j ∈ {L,R}. This game has a unique Nash equilibrium
when πLR > πLL < πRL and πRL > πRR < πLR, which requires each player to use
a mixed strategy. When this game is repeated, equilibrium theory yields two sharp
testable predictions about the behavior of the players:
1. The probability that a goal will be scored should be the same across strategies
for each player, and equal to the equilibrium success probability: p for the kicker and
1 − p for the goalkeeper, with p =( πLRπRL − πLLπRR)/(πLR − πLL + πRL − πRR).
2. Each player’s choices must be serially independent. That is, intertemporal links
between occurrences must be absent. Hence, players’ choices must be independent
draws from a random process and should notd e p e n do no n e ’ so w np r e v i o u sp l a y ,o n
the opponent’s previous play, or on any other previous actions and outcomes.
Using data on over a thousand penalty kicks during a ﬁve year period in three
countries, Palacios-Huerta (2003) ﬁnds strong support for the two implications of this
2x2 model. We adopt this model and take it to the laboratory. The payoﬀs we will
use in the experiment are:
πLL =0 .60; πLR =0 .95; πRL =0 .90; πRR =0 .70,
which come from a sample of 2,717 penalty kicks collected from professional leagues
in Europe during the period 1995-2004.14 No other ﬁeld referents are used in the
experiment, and no references are made to soccer terminology or any aspect of the
natural environment that may trigger any type of psychological motivations.15 In
particular, subjects are not told that the structure of the game corresponds to a
p e n a l t yk i c ko rt h a tt h ep a y o ﬀs correspond to empirically observed probabilities.
14The exact empirical probabilities in the sample are πLL =0 .597, πLR =0 .947, πRL =0 .908,
and πRR =0 .698. The sample includes the 1,417 penalties studied in Palacios-Huerta (2003), which
discusses how to treat the few ocassions in which the strategy of “center” may be observed in the
soccer ﬁeld.
15As is well known, the choice of parameters can add some ﬁeld context to experiments. The idea,
pioneered by Grether and Plott (1984) and Hong and Plott (1982), is to estimate parameters that
are relevant to ﬁeld applications and take these into the lab.
7The rules of the experiment, which follow as closely as possible O’Neill’s (1987),
are the following. The players sat opposite each other at a table. Kickers played the
role of row player and goalkeepers the role of column player. Each held two cards
(A and B) with identical backs. A large board across the table prevented them from
seeing the backs of each opponent’s cards. The experimenter gave them one page
with the following instructions (in Spanish), which he then read aloud to them:
“We are interested in how people play a simple game. You will ﬁrst
play this game for about 15 hands for practice, just to make sure you
are clear about the rules and the results. Then, you will play a series of
hands for real money at 1 euro per hand. Before we begin, ﬁrst examine
these dice. They will be used at some point during the experiment. They
generate a number between 1 and 100 using a 10-face die for the tens and
another 10-face die for the units. The faces of each die are marked from
‘0’ to ‘9,’ so the resulting number goes from ‘01’ to ‘99,’ where ‘00’ means
100. [The two subjects examine the dice and play with them.] The rules
are as follows:
1. Each player has two cards: A and B.
2. When I say “ready” each of you will select a card from your hand
and place it face down on the table. When I say “turn,” turn your card face
up and determine the winner. (I will be recording the cards as played).
3. The winner should announce “I win,” and will then receive 1 euro.
4. Then return the card to your hand, and get it ready for the next
round.
I will explain how the winner is determined next. Are there any ques-
tions so far?
Now, the winner is determined with the help of the dice as follows:
• If there is a match AA, [row player’s name] wins if the dice yield a
number between 01 and 60; otherwise [column player’s name] wins.
• If there is a match BB, [row player’s name] wins if the dice yield a
number between 01 and 70; otherwise [column player’s name] wins.
• If there is a mismatch AB, [row player’s name] wins if the dice yield
a number between 01 and 95; otherwise [column player’s name] wins.
• If there is a mismatch BA, [row player’s name] wins if the dice yield
a number between 01 and 90; otherwise [column player’s name] wins.





Are there any questions?”
8Thus, the game was presented with the help of a matrix, and subjects learned
the rules by a few rounds of practice. The unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in this
game is 0.3636 and 0.4545 for the probability of choosing left for the row and column
player respectively. They played 15 rounds for practice and then 150 times for real
money, proceeding at their own speed. They were not told the number of hands they
will play. On the few occasions they happened to make an error announcing the
winner, the experimenter corrected them.
The typical session lasted about one hour and ﬁfteen minutes, proceeding at about
2 hands per minute. From the perspective of the response times study of Rubinstein
(2005) on instinctive and cognitive reasoning, it may be of interest to note that
professionals took on average 70.0 minutes, which is 15 percent less time than the
average time taken by college students: 81 minutes and 24 seconds. The diﬀerence is
statistically signiﬁcant.
2.2.2 Experiment 2: O’Neill (1987)
The design of this experiments closely follows O’Neill’s original design. The players
sat opposite each other at a table. Each held four cards with identical backs. A
large board across the table prevented them from seeing the backs of each opponent’s
cards. The experimenter gave one page with the following instructions (in Spanish)
to the participants, which he then read aloud to them:
“We are interested in how people play a simple game. You will ﬁrst
play this game for about 15 hands for practice, just to make sure you are
clear about the rules and results. Then, you will play a series of hands
for money at 1 euro per hand. The rules are as follows:
1. Each player has four cards: {Red, Brown, Purple, Green}.
2. When I say “ready” each of you will select a card from your hand
and place it face down on the table. When I say “turn,” turn your card face
up and determine the winner. (I will be recording the cards as played).
3. The winner should announce “I win,” and will then receive 1 euro.
4. Then return the card to your hand, and get it ready for the next
round.
Are there any questions?
Now, to determine the winner: [subject 1’s name] wins if there is a
match of Greens (two Greens played) or a mismatch of other cards (Red-
Brown for example); hence, [subject 2’s name] wins if there is a match of
cards other than Green (Purple-Purple f o re x a m p l e )o ram i s m a t c ho fa
Green (one Green, one other card).”
9Thus, the game was presented without the help of a matrix and subjects learned
the rules by practice. The payoﬀ structure of the game is:
1\2 Red Brown Purple Green
Red − ++−
Brown + − + −
Purple ++ −−
Green −− − +
where the ‘+’ and ‘−’ symbols denote a win by the row and column player respectively.
The stage and the repeated games have a unique equilibrium which requires both
players to randomize with probabilities 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.4, respectively. Subjects played
15 rounds for practice and then 200 times for real money, proceeding at their own
speed. They were not told the number of hands they will play. If they happened to
make an error in determining the winner, the experimenter corrected them.
A ﬁrst diﬀerence with respect to O’Neill’s design is that the subjects engage in
200 stage games instead of 105. A second diﬀerence involves renaming the elements of
the action space. Rather than using {Ace, Two, Three, Joker},w eu s e{Red, Brown,
Purple, Green}, as in Shachat (2002), in order to avoid the previously observed
Ace bias.16 Yet, in order to avoid confusion and to facilitate comparison with the
literature, actions will be refereed to by the names used in O’Neill’s experiment for the
remaining exposition of the paper: 1 (Ace)f o rRed,2( Two)f o rBrown,3( Three)
for Purple,a n dJ (Joker)f o rGreen.Aﬁnal diﬀerence involves using much greater
stage game payoﬀs (the winner receives 1 euro for a win, that is about 1.30 dollars
using the exchange rate at the time the experiment took place, rather than 5 cents),
and not giving any initial endowments to the players.
For the experiment with college students, these diﬀerences are useful to study
the extent to which, relative to the implementation in O’Neill, a larger number of
repetitions and much greater payoﬀs may take students in the direction of the unique
equilibrium of the game.
The typical session lasted slightly above one hour, proceeding at about 3.3 hands
per minute. As in the previous case, professionals took less time than college students
(in this case about 11 percent less time on average: 61.2 versus 67.9 minutes). The
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant.
16See O’Neill (1987) and Brown and Rosenthal (1991).
103 Experimental Evidence
This section is structured as follows. We ﬁrst describe the evidence from the penalty
kick experiment for both the professionals and the college students with no soccer
experience, and then the results for O’Neill’s experiment for each of these two pools
of subjects. In section 4 we discuss the results for the college students with soccer
experience in both experiments, and other extensions.
3.1 Penalty Kick Experiment
3.1.1 Professional Soccer Players
Table 1A presents aggregate statistics describing the outcomes of the experiment.
In what follows we use the standard notation of L and R instead of A and B.I n
the top panel each interior cell reports the relative frequency with which the pair of
moves corresponding to that cell occurred. In parenthesis are the Minimax relative
frequencies and in brackets the standard deviation for the observed relative frequen-
cies under the Minimax hypothesis. At theb o t t o ma n dt ot h er i g h ta r et h eo v e r a l l
relative frequencies with which players were observed to play a particular card, again
accompanied by the corresponding relative frequencies and standard deviations under
the Minimax model. Observed and Minimax win frequencies for the row player are
reported in the bottom panel.
[Table A1 here]
These aggregate data seem to conform well to the equilibrium predictions. There
is a general consistency with the Minimax model in the pattern of observed rela-
tive frequencies for each pair of choices, especially for the pair that is played more
frequently, RR. As to the marginal frequencies of actions for the players, they are
extremely close to the Minimax predictions for the column player. Row players, on
the other hand, choose frequencies 0.333 for L and 0.667 for R, which are close to the
Minimax predictions but statistically diﬀerent from them. As to the aggregate row
player observed win frequency (0.7947), it is less than one standard deviation away
from the theoretically expected value (0.7909).
Data at the individual pair level allow a closer scrutiny of the extent to which
Minimax play may be supported for most individual subjects and most pairs of play-
ers. Table A2 reports the relative frequencies of choices for each of the twenty pairs
in the sample and some initial tests of the model.
[Table A2 here]
11The Minimax hypothesis implies that the choices of actions represent independent
drawings from a binomial distribution where the probabilities of L are 0.363 and 0.454
for the raw and column players, respectively. We should then expect a binomial test
of conformity with Minimax play to reject the null hypothesis for 2 players at the
5 percent signiﬁcance level, and 4 players at the 10 percent level. The results show
that indeed these are precisely the number of rejections at those conﬁdence levels.
Clearly, these initial ﬁndings may be taken as consistent with the hypothesis that
professional soccer players play according to the equilibrium of the game. Yet, they
lend only partial support at this point. One reason is that equilibrium behavior also
implies that action combinations should be realizations of independent drawings of
a multinomial distribution. In principle, it might well be the case that the marginal
frequencies conform well to the equilibrium strategies while at the same time the
players’s actions are highly correlated.
In order to test whether the players’ actions are correlated we perform two tests.
First, Minimax play implies that action combinations are realizations of independent
drawings from a multinomial distribution with probabilities 0.165 for LL,0 . 1 9 8f o r
LR,0 . 2 8 9f o rRL and 0.347 for RR. Table A2 reports the relative frequencies of
each combination of actions for each of the twenty pairs in the sample. Using the
corresponding absolute frequencies along with their Minimax probabilities, we can
then test the joint hypothesis that players choose actions with the equilibrium fre-
quency and that their choices are stochastically independent. A Chi-square test for
conformity with Minimax play based on Pearson’s goodness of ﬁtw i t h3d e g r e e so f
freedom produces the p-values reported in the last column of the table. Under the
Minimax play we would expect to reject the null hypothesis for 1 and 2 pairs at the
5 and 10 percent signiﬁcance levels. We ﬁnd 0 and 2 rejections, respectively.
The second test is the one Brown and Rosenthal (1990) devised to check for
contemporaneous correlation in players’ choices. The results are shown in Table A3.
[Table A3 here]
The ﬁrst column reports the observed win percentage. The second reports the
expected win percentage, using observed card frequencies, under the assumption that
the players’ choices are i.i.d. drawings from a pair-speciﬁc stationary binomial dis-
tribution. Column three shows the eﬀect of chosen mixtures, which is computed as
the diﬀerence between the observed row player winning percentage and the Minimax
value of 0.7909. The diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two columns measures the contribu-
tion of correlated play to observed row-player winning percentages, and it is reported
in the fourth column. It is apparent that the average absolute contributions of both
the mixture and the correlated play eﬀects are extremely small. The Chi-square
statistics for the signiﬁcance of each of these eﬀects are minuscule, the probability
values for which are virtually unity. These results may be taken as consistent with the
hypothesis that professional players play according to the equilibrium of the game.
12We take from this initial evidence that, even though the observed aggregate fre-
quency for the row players is slightly diﬀerent from the equilibrium predictions, the
hypothesis of Minimax play gets substantial support in the tests of the binomial and
multinomial models for observed choice frequencies, and in the tests of independence.
Next, we turn to testing more closely the implications of the equilibrium of the game.
i. Winning Rates and the Distribution of Play
M i n i m a xp l a yi m p l i e st h a tt h es u c c e s sp r o b abilities of each action should be the
same for each player, and equal to 0.7909 for the row player and 0.2090 for the column
player. Further, when combined with the equilibrium strategies, we can obtain the
relative action-outcome frequencies associated with the equilibrium.
Table A4 reports the relative frequencies of action-outcomes combinations ob-
served for each of the row and column players in the sample. Using the absolute
frequencies corresponding to these entries, we can then implement a Chi-square test
of conformity with Minimax play. This test would be identical to the one performed
in Table A2 if it were not for the fact that the success rate is determined not only by
the choice of strategies but also by the realization of the dice.
[Table A4 here]
The results of the test show that the null hypothesis is rejected for no player at
the 5 percent signiﬁcance level, and for 3 players at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level,
in both cases fewer than the expected number of rejections, 2 and 4 respectively.
Hence, at the individual level the hypothesis that scoring probabilities are identical
across strategies and to the equilibrium rate cannot be rejected for most players at
conventional signiﬁcance levels.
With regard to whether behavior at the aggregate level may be considered to be
generated from equilibrium play, this idea may be evaluated by testing the joint hy-
pothesis that each one of the experiments is simultaneously generated by equilibrium
play. The test statistic for the Pearson joint test is simply the sum of the individual
test statistics for each type of players. Under the null hypothesis, it is distributed
as a χ2 with 60 degrees of freedom for the set of row players and likewise for the set
of column players. We ﬁnd that the Pearson statistics are 40.002 and 32.486, with
associated p-value above ninety percent in both cases.17 Hence, the null hypothesis
that the data for all players were generated by equilibrium play cannot be rejected
at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
We interpret these individual and aggregate results as consistent with the hy-
pothesis that these subjects equate their strategies’ payoﬀs to the equilibrium success
rates.
17The test statistics for the raw and column players may not be added given that within each pair
the players’ success rates are not independent.
13ii. The Serial Independence Hypothesis
The second testable implication of equilibrium play is that a player should random-
ize using the same distribution at each stage of the game. This implies that players’
choices are serially independent. The work on randomization is extensive in the ex-
perimental economics and psychological literatures. Interestingly, to our knowledge
this hypothesis has never found support in a laboratory setting. In particular, when
subjects are asked to generate random sequences their sequences often have negative
autocorrelation, that is, individuals exhibit a bias against repeating the same choice
(see Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991), Rapoport and Budescu (1992), Rapoport and
Boebel (1992) and Mookherjee and Sopher (1994)).18 This phenomenon is sometimes
referred to as the “Law of Small Numbers” (Tversky and Kanheman (1971), Camerer
(1995)). The only possible exception that we are aware of is Neuringer (1986) who ex-
plicitly taught subjects to choose randomly after hours of training by providing them
with detailed feedback from previous blocks of responses in the experiment. These
training data are interesting in that they suggest that experienced subjects might be
able to learn to generate randomness. In our case, however, subjects have accumu-
lated their experience in an entirely diﬀerent environment: a soccer ﬁeld. Moreover,
professional soccer players rarely take penalty kicks in the ﬁeld in rapid succession,
as they are asked to in the experiment. Instead, there is often a substantial time
delay, typically weeks, between subsequent penalties.19 Whether their experience on
randomization in the ﬁeld in circumstances where repetitions are not taken in rapid
succession is useful to generate random sequences in a laboratory setting where stage
games are repeated in rapid succession is the question to which we turn next.
We consider the following tests of serial independence previously performed in the
literature:
A. Runs Tests. Consider the sequence of actions chosen by player i in the









L are the number of R and L choices made by player i.
A run is deﬁned as a succession of one or more identical actions which are followed
and preceded by a diﬀerent action or no action at all. When the choices si
x are
18Slonim, Erev and Roth (2003) ﬁnd evidence of positive autocorrelation in various zero-sum 2x2
games.
19Most players are not involved in more than 15-20 penalty kick situations per season, that is in
about one such situation every two weeks. It could be argued that these time lags between penalties
might inhibit the memory of past realizations, which would in turn help players randomize correctly.
However, this conjecture may not be correct. The reason is that every penalty kick that is taken in
professional leagues is televised and a common practice among professional players is to keep written
records on their opponents’ behavior (Anthony, 2000). Keeping records may then induce, perhaps,
even better memory than if penalties were shot in rapid succession. Penalty shoot-outs that take
place in elimination tournaments to break ties are an exception in which kicks occur in a short span
of time. Even in these cases, however, only ﬁve penalties are typically taken and these involve ﬁve
diﬀerent kickers facing the same goalkeeper.
14serially independent, all the combinations of ni
R right choices and ni
L left choices out
of ni
L + ni
R choices are equally probable. In that case, the probability of observing
r runs in a sequence of ni
L + ni
R action choices, ni
L left and ni
R right, is known (see
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Let ri be the observed number of runs in the sequence si. Then the null hypothesis
of serial independence will be rejected at the 5 percent conﬁdence level if the prob-
ability of ri or fewer runs is less than .025 or if the probability of ri or more runs
is less than .025; that is, if F (r|ni
L,n i









R) denotes the probability of obtaining r or fewer
runs.20 The results of these tests are shown in Table A5.
[Table A5 here]
We ﬁnd that the null hypothesis of serial independence is rejected for very few
players at conventional signiﬁcance levels: 2 players at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level
and 4 players at the 10 percent level, precisely the expected number of rejections in
both cases under the null hypothesis. These results indicate that the hypothesis that
professional soccer players generate random sequences cannot be rejected according
to this test. They neither switch strategies too often nor too little, and the number
of rejections is remarkably consistent with the theory. This behavior, therefore, is in
sharp contrast with the overwhelming experimental evidence from the psychological
and experimental literatures mentioned earlier.21 In this case it shows that years
of experience in the ﬁeld is quite valuable, even if it comes from situations where
repetitions are not taken in rapid succession, and from circumstances that are vastly
diﬀerent from those they ﬁnd in the laboratory.
B. Logit Equation for Individual Players. Brown and Rosenthal (1990)
suggest using a logit model to study whether past choices and outcomes play a role
20The authors also oﬀer a normal approximation to the null distribution.
21The joint hypothesis that each of the forty experiments is serially independent may be tested fol-












seem to be uniformly distributed in the [0,1] interval, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) test cannot be applied directly to these values because they are neither identically nor continu-
ously distributed. Thus, a KS goodness-of-ﬁt test can be developed by constructing a random draw














for each player i. Under the null
hypothesis of serial independence di is distributed as a U[0,1]. After performing ten thousand trials
with such random draws for each player, the average p-value of the KS statistic that compares the
cumulative distribution of the realized values di with the uniform distribution is 0.507 with a std.
deviation of 0.166. Hence, the hypothesis that each of the forty experiments is serially independent
cannot be rejected.
15in determining current choices. We follow the formulation suggested in Slonim, Erev
and Roth (2003). The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of the choice R.
The independent variables are a lagged indicator of the same choice, an interaction
between that indicator and whether the subject won in the past round, an interaction
between the lagged alternative choice and whether the subject won in the past round,
a lagged indicator of the opponent’s same choice, and an indicator of the opponent’s
contemporaneous choice R∗. The results are shown in Table A6.
[Table A6 here]
Consistent with the evidence from the runs tests, the main ﬁnding is that the
null hypothesis that all the explanatory variables are jointly statistically insigniﬁcant
(hypothesis #1), i.e., that professional subjects follow a stationary binomial choice
process, can be rejected for only 2 players at the 5 percent level and 4 players at the
10 percent level.
The table also reports the tests of other hypotheses of interest. Hypothesis
#2, which studies whether one’s past choices signiﬁcantly help to determine current
choices, is rejected for only 2 and 5 players at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
Not surprisingly, it is rejected for some of the players that in the previous table had
either a high or a low number of runs.22 The “reinforcement” hypotheses #3 and
#4, which evaluate whether subjects are more likely to repeat an action in round t
i ft h e yw o ni nr o u n dt − 1( β3 > 0, β4 < 0) or less likely (β3 < 0, β4 > 0), only ﬁnd
s u p p o r ti na tm o s tt w oc a s e sa tt h e5p e r c e n tl e v e l . T h er e s u l t sf o rh y p o t h e s i s# 5
support the idea that players believe that his opponent is using a stationary choice
rule in every case except 3 and 4 at the 5 and 10 percent levels. Lastly, the tests of
hypothesis #6 show no eﬀect of contemporaneous opponent’s choice on one’s current
choice for any player except one.
These results are consistent with the previous test of serial independence and
indicate that the choices of most players are unrelated to their own previous choices, to
opponents’ previous choices, and to past outcomes. We thus take the results of the two
tests of randomness as consistent with the hypothesis that the strategies followed by
professional soccer players are serially independent. As such, this evidence represents
the ﬁrst time that individuals have been found to display statistically signiﬁcant serial
independence in a strategic game in a laboratory setting. Jointly with the evidence
supporting the hypothesis that subjects equate payoﬀs across strategies and to the
equilibrium success rates, these results also represent the ﬁr s tt i m et h a ta n ys u b j e c t s
reach a predicted equilibrium in the laboratory in games where players are predicted
to choose probabilistic mixtures. Hence, laboratory ﬁndings are entirely reliable for
predicting ﬁeld behavior for these subjects.
22For row player #5 and column players #3 and #5 the reason is β2 < 0, and for row player #7
and column player #11 it is β2 > 0.
163.1.2 College Students
The results for this subject pool are presented in a way that parallels the presenta-
tion of the evidence for the professional soccer players. Table B1 presents aggregate
statistics describing the aggregate outcomes of the experiment.
[Table B1 here]
Interestingly, the aggregate data for these players also seem to conform to the
equilibrium predictions quite well. There is a broad consistency of the observed rela-
tive frequencies with those implied by the Minimax model, especially for the diagonal
pairs of choices. Moreover, as in the case of professionals, the observed aggregate win
frequency for the row player (0.7877) is also below one standard deviation away from
the expected value. Despite these appearances, however, a closer look quickly reveals
that observed behavior is far from the Minimax predictions. For instance, observed
marginal frequencies for both the row and column players are substantially diﬀerent
from the predicted values, somewhere between 4 to 6 standard deviations away from
them.23 An interesting aspect worth noting is that both players choose very similar
frequencies, roughly 0.40 for L and 0.60 for R. This suggests the possibility that
these subjects, contrary to the way professionals appear to perceive the game, may
not appreciate the slight diﬀerences in payoﬀsi nt h eo ﬀ-diagonal elements of the
payoﬀ matrix, diﬀerences that induce players to adopt strategies diﬀerent from the
opponent.
The rejections of Minimax play are even more apparent in Table B2, which reports
the marginal frequencies for each player and the relative frequencies of choices at the
pair level.
[Table B2 here]
First, the binomial test for conformity with Minimax play indicates that the model
is rejected for 6 and 22 players at the ﬁve and ten percent levels respectively. This
excessively high amount of rejections, three and more than ﬁve times greater than
those predicted by the equilibrium of theg a m ea tt h o s el e v e l s ,m a yb et a k e na sa n
indication that we are going to ﬁnd substantial deviations from equilibrium play in the
subsequent tests of the Minimax hypothesis. Indeed, using the absolute frequencies
corresponding to the observed joint choices reported in the table and their associated
Minimax probabilities, a Chi-square test for conformity with Minimax play indicates
that the model is rejected for 6 and 9 pairs at the ﬁve and ten percent levels of
signiﬁcance when we would only expect 1 and 2 rejections, respectively, under the
null hypothesis.
23The Chi-square test for the conformity with Minimax play based on Pearson goodness of ﬁth a s
a p-value of 2 × 10−13, which is minuscule compared to professionals (4.8 percent) and decisively
rejects the Minimax model at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
17The case of pairs #12 and #20 is interesting. Although the marginal frequencies
with which the players choose each action are not statistically diﬀerent from the
equilibrium strategies, their joint behavior rejects the equilibrium multinomial model.
As can be seen from the data, their joint behavior is highly correlated in that they
tend to choose main diagonal entries too frequently. As we did for professionals,
this aspect is studied further by decomposing the players’ observed behavior into a
mixture eﬀect and a correlation eﬀect. The results are in Table B3.
[Table B3 here]
We ﬁnd that the average absolute contribution of the mixture eﬀect is extremely
small: the Chi-square statistic is 0.1138, with a probability value that is virtually
one. As to the average absolute contribution of the correlated play eﬀect, the mean
absolute value is 0.0279, with a Chi-square statistic of 22.3481 and a probability
value of 0.3219. Under conventional standards, this p-value is clearly high, so we
may not conclude that correlated play is the dominant determinant of the diﬀerence
between observed row-player winning percentages and the Minimax predicted value.
However, it does suggest the possibility that for some college students this might be
a relevant eﬀect. At least, relative to professional soccer players (Chi-square: 3.2344,
p-value: 0.9999), this p-value allow us to suspect that several subjects may deviate
from independence play.
Overall, we take the excessively high amount of rejections we ﬁnd in these tests
as indicating substantial deviations from equilibrium play. Next we turn to testing
the Minimax predictions more closely.
i. Winning Rates and the Distribution of Play
In Table B4 we test whether the distribution of play we observe is equal to the
equilibrium distribution using the success rates of each action for each player.
[Table B4 here]
Using the absolute frequencies corresponding to each action-outcome combination,
a Chi-square test shows that the Minimax multinomial model is rejected for 9 players
at the ﬁve percent signiﬁcance level and 13 players at the ten percent level. These
rejections vastly exceed the expected number of rejections under the hypothesis of
Minimax play, 2 and 4 respectively. Thus, at the individual level the hypothesis
that scoring probabilities are identical across strategies and equal to the equilibrium
strategies can be rejected for an excessively high number of players at conventional
signiﬁcance levels.
With regard to aggregate behavior, the sum of the individual test statistics of
each type of player under the null hypothesis is distributed as a χ2 with 60 degrees
of freedom. For the row players the joint test statistic is 108.652 and for the column
18players 113.102, with associated p-values close to zero in both cases. Hence, the null
hypothesis that the data for all players were generated by equilibrium play is strongly
rejected at conventional and non-conventional signiﬁcance levels.
These results, therefore, are far from equilibrium behavior and highly diﬀerent
from those obtained with professional soccer players.
ii. The Serial Independence Hypothesis
The second testable implication is that a player should randomize by means of
t h es a m ep r o b a b i l i t yd i s t r i b u t i o na te a c hs t a g eo ft h eg a m e .W ei m p l e m e n tt h es a m e
two tests of serial independence implemented for professional players.
A. Runs Tests. First, the results of these tests of serial independence shown in
Table B5 conﬁrm earlier suspicions.
[Table B5 here]
The null hypothesis of serial independence is rejected for 7 players at the 5 percent
signiﬁcance level, more than three times the number of expected rejections, and for
13 players at the 10 percent when we would only expect 4 rejections. These ﬁndings
indicate that college subjects are not able to generate random sequences. Hence, they
are consistent with an extensive experimental evidence in the literature and drastically
diﬀerent from the behavior of professional soccer players observed earlier.24 Also
consistent with past evidence is the fact that in most cases the reason is an excessive
number of alternations.
B. Logit Equation for Individual Players. The results of these tests for
t h ec h o i c eo fR a r es h o w ni nT a b l eB 6 .
[Table B6 here]
The main ﬁnding is that the null hypothesis that college students follow a sta-
tionary binomial choice process in this experiment is rejected for an excessive number
of subjects: 12 players at the 5 percent level and 14 players at the 10 percent level.
Other hypotheses of interest are also frequently rejected. For instance, hypothesis
#2, which tests whether or not one’s past choices contribute to determining current
choices, is rejected for 6 players at the 5 percent level and 8 players at the 10 percent
level. This suggest that a failure to play independently of one’s past choices is an
24As in the case of professionals, we also implemented a KS goodness-of-ﬁtt e s tb yc o n s t r u c t i n ga














for each player i,
which under the null hypothesis of serial independence is distributed as a U[0,1]. After performing
ten thousand trials with such random draws for each player, the average p-value of the KS test
statistic is 0.0002 with a standard deviation of 0.0116. Hence, the hypothesis that each of the forty
experiments is serially independent can be rejected.
19important reason behind many subjects’ inability to generate a stationary choice pro-
cess. Consistent with the runs tests, in most of these cases the reason is a signiﬁcant
preference for alternation (β2 < 0). With regard to the reinforcement hypothesis #3
and #4, we ﬁnd that reinforcement contributes to the non-stationary choice process
in some but not a very large number of cases as well, while the results for hypothesis
#5 support the idea that 8 players at the 10 percent level do not consider that his
opponent is using a stationary choice rule. The evidence from these four hypothesis,
therefore, shows that for almost half of the sample (19 players) at least one of these
hypothesis is rejected at the 10 percent level. Lastly, hypothesis #6 shows a signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect of contemporaneous opponent’s choice on one’s current choice in precisely
ﬁve pairs of players at the 10 percent level.
These results are consistent with the runs tests of serial independence: the choices
of many players are related to their own previous choices, outcomes, and those of the
opponent in various ways, which contribute to generating non-stationary choice pro-
cesses. Consequently, the results of the tests of serial independence decisively indicate
that individuals display statistically signiﬁcant serial dependence. Together with the
results in the tests of equality of winning probabilities, we can then conclude that the
Minimax model cannot be supported for college students.
3.2 O’Neill Experiment
The diﬀerences between professional soccer players and college students are substan-
tial in the penalty kick experiment. Professionals behave consistent with the equi-
librium of the game while college students far from it. In this section we examine a
diﬀerent zero-sum game in an attempt to study whether the experience that profes-
sional players have accumulated in the ﬁeld is useful in laboratory situations that do
not resemble any previously encountered si t u a t i o n .W ei m p l e m e n tt h es a m et e s t sa s
in the penalty kick experiment.
3.2.1 Professional Players
Table C1 presents aggregate statistics describing observed relative frequencies for
each pair of moves and each card. Minimax relative frequencies are in parenthesis,
and their standard deviations under the Minimax hypothesis are in brackets. The
bottom panel reports the observed win frequencies for the row player.
[Table C1 here]
These aggregate data seem to conform remarkably well to the equilibrium predic-
tions. In fact, there is a striking consistency of the observed relative frequencies with
those implied by the Minimax model. Relative frequencies for pairs of plays involv-
ing non-jokers are in the neighborhood of 0.04, while relative frequencies for pairs
20involving one joker and for the pair involving the two jokers are in the neighborhood
of 0.08 and 0.16 respectively. The aggregate row player win frequency (0.3945) is less
than one standard deviation away from the expected value (0.40). Also, a Chi-square
test for the conformity with Minimax play based on Pearson goodness of ﬁti n d i c a t e s
that the Minimax model cannot be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels. It
yields a statistic of 7.873 whose p-value is above ninety percent. As to the marginal
frequencies of actions for the row and column players, they are extremely close to the
Minimax predictions. In every case, they are less than one standard deviation away.
This evidence, however, while highly suggestive, does not mean that Minimax
play can conclusively be supported by the data. Indeed, Brown and Rosenthal (1990)
already found a substantial degree of conformity in O’Neill’s (1987) experiment in the
aggregate data only to ﬁnd in subsequent tests that the Minimax hypothesis could
not possibly be supported.
Table C2 reports the marginal choice frequencies observed in the data for each
player, and the results of the tests of the Minimax model at the individual player,
pair, and card-player levels for these frequencies.
[Table C2 here]
Minimax play indicates that the multinomial model for all cards chosen by row
players, column players, and for both players should be rejected for 1 pair at the 5
percent level and for 2 pairs at the 10 percent level in each of these three models.
The Minimax binomial model for a given card indicates that we should expect 8 and
16 rejections at these signiﬁcance levels respectively. As in the penalty experiment,
it is remarkable that in virtually every case these are the precise number of rejections
that are found. Furthermore, this evidence is strikingly dissimilar from Brown and
Rosenthal’s (1990) analysis of O’Neill’s data with college students.
As indicated in the penalty experiment, however, the fact that the marginal fre-
quencies with which players choose each card seem to correspond to the equilibrium
strategies lends only partial support to the model. The reason is that in principle the
same marginal frequencies may be obtained as a result of a correlated strategy. To
check for contemporaneous correlation we perform Brown and Rosenthal’s decompo-
sition of row players’ winning rates into a mixture and a correlated eﬀect. The results
are in Table C3.
[Table C3 here]
We ﬁnd that the average absolute contribution of both the mixture and the cor-
related play eﬀects are extremely small. The Chi-square statistics for the joint sig-
niﬁcance of each of these eﬀects are minuscule, with probability values close to one.
These results suggest that professional soccer players do not show contemporaneous
correlation in their choices.
21We turn next to a closer examination of the implications of the equilibrium of the
game.
i. Winning Rates and the Distribution of Play
Table C4 tests the null hypothesis that the success probabilities for both players
are identical across strategies and equal to the equilibrium probabilities. As in Walker
and Wooders (2001) analysis of O’Neill’s data, we aggregate actions 1, 2, and 3 into a
single non-Joker action. We then implement the corresponding χ2 test of conformity
with Minimax play. The tests have three degrees of freedom given that the game being
played is known. In other words, as the success probabilities and choice frequencies
in equilibrium are known, there is no need to estimate any parameter.25 The table
also indicates the rejections that are obtained when the test is implemented for the
individual choices of cards, that is when 1, 2, 3,a n dJ are treated on an individual
basis.
[Table C4 here]
The results show that for the choice of Joker and non-Joker the null hypothesis
is rejected for 3 players at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level and for 6 players at the 10
percent signiﬁcance level. The number of rejections when the test is implemented for
the individual cards is 3 and 4 at these levels respectively, which are almost precisely
the number of rejections to be expected according to the null hypothesis.
With respect to whether behavior at the aggregate level can be considered to be
generated from equilibrium play, the test statistic for the Pearson joint test for all
row players is 53.351 with an associated p-value of 0.715, and for all column players
55.122 with an associated p-value of 0.654. Hence, the null hypothesis that the data
for all players were generated by equilibrium play cannot be rejected at conventional
signiﬁcance levels.
ii. The Serial Independence Hypothesis
Another testable implication is that players’ choices are serially independent. We
implement two tests:
A. Runs Tests. A si nW a l k e ra n dW o o d e r s( 2 0 0 1 )t h i st e s ti si m p l e m e n t e df o r
t h ec h o i c eo fJoker and non-Joker cards. Table C5 shows that the null hypothesis of
serial independence is rejected for 2 and 4 players at the 5 and 10 percent signiﬁcance
levels. According to the theory, this is precisely the number of rejections that we
should expect at these levels.
25In ﬁeld data as in soccer penalty kicks or in tennis serves, and contrary to laboratory experi-
ments, the underlying game is not known. Hence, the success probabilities for each player must be
estimated by maximum likelihood. Walker and Wooders (2001) test for the equality of two distri-
butions in O’Neills experimental data also using the maximum likelihood estimate for the success
probabilities for each player, rather than the equilibrium rate. Using the equilibrium rates in their
data, however, yields similar results to the ones they report.
22[Table C5 here]
These ﬁndings, therefore, also support the hypothesis that professional soccer
players are able to generate random sequences in the laboratory.26
B. Logit Equation for Individual Players. To study whether or not past
choices have a role in determining current choices, we estimate the logit equation for
each player suggested by Brown and Rosenthal (1990). The dependent variable is a
dichotomous indicator of the choice J. The independent variables are ﬁrst and second
lagged indicators for both players’ past choices, ﬁrst and second lags for the product
of their choices, and an indicator for the opponent’s current choices. The results are
shown in Table C6.
[Table C6 here]
The main ﬁnding is that the null hypothesis that all the explanatory variables
are jointly statistically insigniﬁcant (hypothesis #1) can be rejected for relatively
few players at both the 5 and 10 percent levels. The results for hypotheses #2 to
#5 indicate that they are rejected for no more than 3 players at the 5 percent level,
typically row players #2 and #11 and column player #2. At the 10 percent level,
hypothesis #2 is the only one that shows a slightly greater number of rejections,
while the reinforcement of successful actions (hypotheses #3 and #4) is signiﬁcant
at this level for very few players. Lastly, there is no evidence of correlation with
opponent’s past actions (hypothesis #5) or with opponent’s contemporaneous actions
(hypothesis #6) for any player except for three row players. These results indicate
that the choices of most players are unrelated to their own previous choices and
outcomes, and to opponents’ previous choices and outcomes.
We take the results of these three testso fr a n d o m n e s sa sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h e
hypothesis that the strategies followed by professional soccer players are serially in-
dependent. As such, this class of subjects continues to display statistically signiﬁcant
serial independence in their choices within a laboratory setting. As indicated in
the penalty kick experiment, this behavior is sharply diﬀerent from the overwhelm-
ing experimental evidence reported in the psychological and experimental literature
on randomization, which consistently ﬁnds that subjects, typically college students,
generate sequences that exhibit negative autocorrelation. The interesting additional
aspect is that, in this case, professionals are involved in a zero-sum game that is en-
tirely diﬀerent in terms of number of strategies and payoﬀ structure from the penalty
kick experiment or other situation they may have found in the ﬁeld.















for each player i, yields an average value of
the p-value of the test statistic that compares the cumulative distribution of the realized values di
with the uniform distribution of 0.420 with a standard deviation of 0.117. Hence, the hypothesis
that each of the forty experiments is serially independent cannot be rejected.
233.2.2 College Students
In principle, it is conceivable that it is the greater stage payoﬀst h a tw eo ﬀer and the
greater number of repetitions that we undertake in the experiment relative to previous
implementations of the experiment in the literature, and not the ﬁeld experience of
the subjects, that are causing the consistency with the Minimax hypothesis. Thus,
we turn next to the study of college students under identical circumstances to those
faced by professionals.
The results are presented in Tables D1 to D6 in a way that parallels the pre-
sentation of the empirical evidence for the professional soccer players. They can be
summarized as follows.
We ﬁnd that the general results in Brown and Rosenthal (1991), Walker and
Wooders (2001) and Shachat (2002) with O’Neill’s experiment are replicated here.
Even though aggregate frequency data does not seem too far from equilibrium behav-
ior, the Minimax hypothesis is decisively rejected in virtually every test we implement.
Observed aggregate row player win percentage is more than one standard deviation
away from the predicted value (Table D1). Observed card, player, and card-player
choices reject the diﬀerent Minimax multinomial models for all cards, as well as the
Minimax binomial model for a given card, in an excessively large number of cases
(Table D2), and correlated play eﬀect cannot be argued to be the dominant eﬀect at
conventional signiﬁcance levels (Table D3). Individual Pearson tests for the equality
of winning rates to the equilibrium one are also rejected for a very high number of
subjects; at the aggregate level the joint hypothesis is decisively rejected for all row
players and all column players as well, both when cards are treated as NJ and J,
and when they are treated on an individual basis (Table D4). There is strong evi-
dence that too many players relative to the Minimax predictions exhibit statistically
signiﬁcant serial dependence in the runs tests (Table D5), in fact about three times
the number of rejections observed for professional players. Finally, the logit equa-
tion for individual players reveals that for 13 players in the sample the hypothesis of
stationary binomial choice process can be rejected at the 10 percent level (Table D6).
As in the penalty kick experiment, these ﬁndings are in sharp contrast with those
obtained for professional soccer players. These results also testify to the robustness
of previous ﬁndings in the literature. Although we use much greater monetary in-
centives and more repetitions than in O’Neill’s original experiment, and we do ﬁnd
improvements in the behavior of college students from the perspective of equilibrium
(see Table F in the next section for a comparison), the Minimax model continues to
be rejected decisively. Given that the circumstances of the experiment are identical
for college students and professional players, and that professionals behave consis-
tent with the equilibrium of the game, the results indicate that ﬁeld experience is
important and does transfer to this zero-sum game as well.
244 Discussion and Additional Evidence
The ﬁndings that professional soccer players play according to equilibrium in both
the penalty kick and O’Neill experiments, while college students play far from equi-
librium behavior in both games, contribute to dissecting the possibly fundamental
characteristics of laboratory experiments as a source of predictions for the real world
in the class of strategic games we study.
There is a growing literature in experimental economics that shows how certain
a n o m a l i e sf o u n di ne x p e r i m e n t sw i t hs t u d e n t sa ss u b j e c t sa r ea t t e n u a t e dw h e nt h e
experiments are implemented, instead, with a non-standard pool of subjects in their
own natural environment (e.g., List (2003, 2004)). On the other hand, there is also
evidence that experienced players still exhibit some non-equilibrium behavior when
they play under laboratory conditions where they perform abstract tasks that lack
a familiar context and that may not capture all the relevant aspects of the environ-
ment encountered in the ﬁeld.27 There is also a literature that addresses the eﬀect
o fc o n t e x ta sa ni n d u c e m e n tt o w a r d se q u i l i b r i u mb e h a v i o r .C o o p e re ta l( 1 9 9 9 ) ,f o r
instance, show that context speeds up the learning process of Chinese managers to-
wards equilibrium play in a signaling game. In the psychology literature, Cosmides
(1989) and Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) report experimental evidence that the intro-
duction of context reduces dramatically the anomalous behavior in the unfamiliar
but arguably simple Wason selection task.28 In our experiments, professional soccer
players were given no contextual cues. Although our 2x2 games were calibrated to
be as close as possible to the real life penalty kick, players were not informed of this
fact. Furthermore, O’Neill’s 4x4 game is far from being a representation of any in-
teractive situation soccer players may encounter in their everyday life. Therefore, it
seems somewhat striking that players did not exhibit any signiﬁcant departure from
Minimax play. The following observations may help elucidate our results:
Simplicity of the game. The zero-sum games studied in our experiments are very
simple and do not require too much abstraction. They are complete information
games with very few actions. In fact, our 2x2 game requires little more than the
various tasks professional players perform on a day-to-day basis. Note that besides
playing one game per week, these people practice 4-5 hours a day, 4-5 days a week,
for 10 months a year, and soccer is a game that involves many zero-sum strategic
situations (not only penalty kicks) that require randomization. In this sense, our
subjects might have spent a large part of their lives generating i.i.d. sequences while
27Kagel (1995), for instance, suggests that the reasons why professional bidders from the construc-
tion industry fall prey to the winner’s curse in the experiments he cites are that (i) experiments
strip away a number of contextual cues that they employ in ﬁeld settings, and (ii) the bidding
environment created in the experiment is not representative of the environment encountered in the
ﬁeld as the construction industry has private value and repeated play elements that are not present
in the experiments.
28Ortmann and Gigerenzer (2000) summarize the results of the eﬀect of context on experimental
outcomes in this task.
25facing opponents that do the same. O’Neill’s game on the other hand is simple in
the sense that there are only two payoﬀ levels; all that players need to know is that
there are outcomes in which they win, and others in which they lose. Compare this
simplicity with the informational requirements of common value auctions like the ones
used in several experimental studies (e.g., Kagel (1995), Harrison and List (2005)).
I nt h e s et y p eo fa u c t i o n s ,t h e r ei sa nu n d e r l y i n g( p o s s i b l yi n ﬁnite) set of states of the
world over which each player holds a prior, and each player has a state dependent
utility function. Unlike in O’Neill’s game, both the priors and the utility functions
aﬀect the equilibria of these Bayesian games. Strategies in these games are very
complicated objects, and the equilibrium ones are much more diﬃcult to calculate,
or even guess, than those in our zero-sum games.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium: Both our zero-sum games have unique equilibria
that are independent of the risk preferences of the players. Players only need to
know that both players want to win. Even simple signaling games like Cooper et
al (1999) are of an order of magnitude more complex than our zero-sum games.29
They usually have several equilibria which even the most accepted reﬁnements fail
to disqualify. It is not completely surprising then that some contextual cues may
help players coordinate on one of them. In our zero-sum games there is not much to
coordinate on. Moreover, we know of no solution concept that does not select the
Minimax strategies in zero-sum games. It seems that context does not add much to
the structure of the simplest of these games.
These considerations may help to explain why none of the potential drawbacks
and limitations associated with the artiﬁcial environment that represents a laboratory
seem to induce professional players to play diﬀe r e n t l yf r o mt h ew a yt h e yp l a yi nt h e
ﬁeld (in the penalty kick experiment) and from Minimax equilibrium play (in both
games). At the same time, they are not suﬃcient for inexperienced student subjects
to play according to the predictions of equilibrium.
Additional evidence has been obtained that enables us to study various aspects
further:
1. We have ﬁrst studied the robustness of some of the results with smaller samples
of subjects. For instance, in the penalty kick experiment we used payoﬀst h a ta r e
entirely diﬀerent from the scoring probabilities occurring in the ﬁeld. We also studied
the behavior of professional players where kickers in the soccer ﬁeld play the role of
goalkeepers in the laboratory and vice versa. Although care should be exercised
here since our sample sizes are smaller, we ﬁnd that none of these modiﬁcations
of the experimental procedures seem to cause any signiﬁcant changes in the basic
results obtained earlier: professional soccer players continue playing consistent with
the equilibrium predictions while college students do not.30
29This may explain the observation in Cooper et al (1999) that in abstract tasks, without contex-
tual cues, students tend to perform old managers with inferior education.
30T h e s er e s u l t sa r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
262. We also implemented two other tests of time independence:
(i) First, we considered the test suggested in Shachat (2002), where the indepen-
dent variable is the joint realization of a pair of strategies using one and two lags. Not
surprisingly, we ﬁnd that there is still substantial serial correlation among standard
college students but not among professional soccer players.
(ii) Second, we pooled all 40 subjects for each experiment and class of players and
estimated the binary choice dynamic panel data model with predetermined endoge-
nous variables and unobserved individual heterogeneity developed in Arellano and
Carrasco (2003).31 The model controls for the potential eﬀects of state dependence
that may be caused by past choices and past outcomes. The results conﬁrm previ-
ous ﬁndings. No lagged endogenous variables (past own and opponent’s choices and
outcomes alone or interacted) are signiﬁcant for professional players, while negative
autocorrelation and positive reinforcement signiﬁcantly characterize the behavior of
college students.
3. The important diﬀerences among subject pools open up various avenues for
further research. For instance, it may be of interest to study the extent to which ﬁeld
experience at the professional level is necessary to reach the predicted equilibrium.
As indicated earlier, we have pursued this question by recruiting subjects drawn from
the same pool of male college students as the students recruited previously, except
that they were required to be currently playing in one of the oﬃcial amateur senior
regional leagues, including Tercera Division, described in Section 2.32 Playing in these
leagues is still quite competitive. Amateur teams practice as often as professional ones
and have exactly the same 10-month playing schedule. Also, players in these leagues
began playing soccer as early as those that became professional. Hence, conditional
on age, they have roughly the same years of ﬁeld experience. They simply are not as
skilled as professional players in the many diﬀerent aspects of the game.
We implemented both the penalty kick experiment and O’Neill’s experiment for
these subjects. Due to space limitations, rather than showing the corresponding
tables, we make them available in an appendix (Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2006),
and just report the main results of each of the tests. Table E shows the results
for the penalty kick experiment and Table F for O’Neill’s experiment. To facilitate
a comparison of the results, we also include the results obtained with professional
players and college students with no soccer experience presented earlier. In Table F,
in addition, we include the results of Pearson’s tests of equality of winning rates when,
rather than using the equilibrium value, we use its maximum likelihood estimate,33
31As is known, in ﬁxed-eﬀect models parameter estimates can be biased and inconsistent when the
explanatory variables are predetermined rather than strictly exogenous. See Arellano and Honor´ e
(2002) for a review. Arellano and Carrasco (2003), however, develop a consistent random-eﬀects
estimator where explanatory variables are predetermined but not strictly exogenous, and where
individual eﬀects may be correlated with explanatory variables.
32There are no statistical diﬀerences in the distributions of demographic characteristics such as
age and years of education between these two diﬀerent pools of college students.
33This is the procedure that Walker and Wooders (2001) follow in their reanalysis of O’Neill’s
27and the original results of O’Neill’s experiment reported in Brown and Rosenthal
(1990) and Walker and Wooders (2001).
[Tables E and F here]
We ﬁnd that the behavior of these subjects adheres in many cases almost as closely
as the behavior of professionals to the equilibrium predictions, and sometimes even
slightly better. As such they diﬀer greatly from the way the standard pool of college
students behave.
These results indicate that years of ﬁeld experience playing soccer, a game that
oﬀers several opportunities to behave strategically in zero-sum situations, are a critical
determinant of behavior in the laboratory.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has taken advantage of three distinct features of soccer: (i) the existence of
a precisely deﬁned strategic situation played in the soccer ﬁeld whose formal structure
can be reproduced in the laboratory, (ii) the fact that this situation involves mixed-
strategy interaction between subjects and has a unique individually rational payoﬀ
vector, and (iii) the evidence that professional subjects play in a real life setting
according to the equilibrium of this game. These features are helpful for designing a
ﬁrst artefactual ﬁeld experiment about mixed-strategy interactions that isolates the
role of “laboratory context” and which allows the comparison of ﬁeld and laboratory
behavior.
We ﬁnd that ﬁeld experience “travels” from the familiar soccer ﬁeld to the highly
unfamiliar laboratory when subjects play a game that is formally identical to a game
they ﬁnd under natural circumstances. Field experience is also valuable for reaching
the equilibrium in a zero-sum game that subjects have never faced before. These
ﬁndings provide insights into the transfer of knowledge across strategic settings and
also indicate that is important how experience is deﬁned in experimental settings.
Our results may have theoretical, methodological and cognitive implications:
In terms of the theory, since professionals behave according to equilibrium, the
theoretical concept of equilibrium may have greater predictive power than previously
considered, even in artiﬁcial settings such as a laboratory.
From a methodological perspective the results are relevant to the extent that
the data that are typically used to inform game theory, and increasingly theoretical
developments in other areas in economics and social sciences as well, often comes
from laboratory environments. In this sense, the insights obtained in the laboratory
data. It implies that the tests at the player level have 1 degree of freedom instead of 3.
28with the pool of subjects that we would be interested in studying empirically in the
ﬁeld seem perfectly applicable for predicting ﬁeld behavior.
Lastly, from a cognitive perspective our ﬁndings are consistent with the idea that
skills have been learned unconsciously and are active in the solution of the games
we have studied. In this sense, “the demonstrated capacity of motivated subjects
to ﬁnd equilibrium outcomes by repeated interaction in market experiments without
cognitive awareness of this capacity” emphasized in Smith (2005) and other authors
is supported, for the ﬁrst time to our knowledge, in situations requiring use of mixed
strategies. From this perspective, Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005) discuss
neurological evidence showing how as subjects gain experience with certain tasks and
situations brain activity “becomes more streamlined, concentrating in regions that
specialize in processing relevant to the task.” We cannot disregard the idea that
years of ﬁeld experience in diﬀerent zero-sum strategic situations, not only in penalty
kicks, have had these eﬀects in professional soccer players. An alternative we cannot
discard either is that those players that became professional were born with greater
aptitude for playing strategic zero-sum games than other subjects.
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Relative Frequencies of Choices and Win Percentages 






          
         Column  Player     
           Choice      Marginal 
         Frequencies  for 
   L  R    Row  Player: 
  L  0.152 0.182    0.333 
     (0.165) (0.198)    (0.364) 
Row     [0.0068] [0.0073]    [0.0088] 
Player          
Choice R 0.310 0.356    0.667 
     (0.289) (0.347)    (0.636) 
     [0.0083] [0.0087]    [0.0088] 
              
      Marginal  0.462 0.538    
Frequencies for  (0.455) (0.545)    
Column Player:  [0.009] [0.009]    
 
 
B. Win Percentages  
    
Observed Row Player Win Percentage:  0.7947
Minimax Row Player Win Percentage:  0.7909




Notes: In Panel A numbers in parentheses represent Minimax predicted relative  
frequencies. Numbers in brackets represent standard deviations for observed relative 
frequencies under the Minimax hypothesis. In Panel B, Minimax Row Player Win  
Percentage and Std. Deviation are the mean and the std. deviation of the observed row  
player mean percentage win under the Minimax hypothesis. 
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Notes: ** and * denote rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively of the Minimax binomial model for the marginal frequencies  
of the row and column players. In the last column they denote rejections of the joint hypothesis that both players in a pair choose actions  











L LL  LR  RL  RR  χ
2  p-value 
1  0.320 0.453  0.140  0.180  0.313  0.367  0.729 
2  0.360    0.380*  0.127  0.233  0.253  0.387  0.305 
3  0.307 0.427  0.127  0.180  0.300  0.393  0.459 
4  0.327 0.460  0.153  0.173  0.307  0.367  0.819 
5  0.327 0.493  0.153  0.173  0.340  0.333  0.568 
6  0.340 0.480  0.140  0.200  0.340  0.320  0.525 
7     0.287**  0.427  0.133  0.153  0.293  0.420  0.190 
8  0.320 0.460  0.100  0.220  0.360  0.320   0.068* 
9  0.307 0.467  0.133  0.173  0.333  0.360  0.479 
10  0.313 0.480  0.167  0.147  0.313  0.373  0.454 
11  0.353 0.480  0.180  0.173  0.300  0.347  0.866 
12    0.427*  0.480  0.193  0.233  0.287  0.287  0.359 
13  0.367 0.473  0.167  0.200  0.307  0.327  0.952 
14  0.327 0.447  0.153  0.173  0.293  0.380  0.782 
15  0.340     0.553**  0.173  0.167  0.380  0.280    0.071* 
16  0.320 0.473  0.160  0.160  0.313  0.367  0.659 
17  0.347 0.467  0.200  0.147  0.267  0.387  0.256 
18  0.327 0.440  0.140  0.187  0.300  0.373  0.791 
19  0.327 0.440  0.140  0.187  0.300  0.373  0.791 




Observed and Expected Win Percentages under the Independence Hypothesis 
for Professional Players 
 
 
   Observed   Expected  Mixture  Correlated 
Pair #   Row Win %  Row Win %  Effect  Play Effect 
1  0.8000 0.7909  0.0000  0.0091 
2  0.8000 0.7908  -0.0001  0.0092 
3  0.7867 0.7900  -0.0009  -0.0034 
4  0.7867 0.7910  0.0001  -0.0044 
5  0.8000 0.7917  0.0008  0.0083 
6  0.7933 0.7912  0.0003  0.0021 
7  0.8067 0.7897  -0.0012  0.0169 
8  0.7800 0.7910  0.0001  -0.0110 
9  0.7933 0.7913  0.0004  0.0020 
10  0.8067 0.7916  0.0007  0.0151 
11  0.7733 0.7911  0.0001  -0.0177 
12  0.8200 0.7900  -0.0009  0.0300 
13  0.7667 0.7909  0.0000  -0.0242 
14  0.8000 0.7907  -0.0002  0.0093 
15  0.7933 0.7922  0.0013  0.0011 
16  0.8067 0.7914  0.0005  0.0153 
17  0.7933 0.7910  0.0001  0.0023 
18  0.7867 0.7906  -0.0003  -0.0039 
19  0.7867 0.7906  -0.0003  -0.0039 
20  0.8133 0.7910  0.0001  0.0223 
Mean Absolute Value:  0.0004 0.0106 
Chi-Square Statistic:     0.0059 3.2344 
Chi-Square Probability Value:     0.9999 0.9999 
 
Notes: Expected winning percentages assume independent play with mixtures observed over all 150 
games for each pair. Mixture effects are defined as the difference between the values in column 2 and 




 Table A4 - Testing that Professional Players Equate  
their Strategies’ Payoffs to the Equilibrium Rates 
 
          
   L  R  Pearson   
Pair #  Player  Success  Fail  Success  Fail  statistic  p-value 
1 Row  0.260  0.060  0.540 0.140  1.360  0.715 
   Column  0.080  0.373  0.120  0.427  0.491  0.921 
2 Row  0.300  0.060  0.500 0.140  0.645  0.886 
 Column 0.047  0.333  0.153  0.467  6.441    0.092* 
3 Row  0.233  0.073  0.553 0.140  2.351  0.503 
   Column  0.100  0.327  0.113  0.460  0.774  0.856 
4 Row  0.247  0.080  0.540 0.133  1.306  0.728 
 Column 0.107  0.353  0.107  0.433  0.302  0.960 
5 Row  0.280  0.047  0.520 0.153  2.278  0.517 
 Column 0.100  0.393  0.100  0.407  0.989  0.804 
6 Row  0.280  0.060  0.513 0.147  0.776  0.855 
 Column 0.080  0.400  0.127  0.393  1.755  0.625 
7 Row  0.207  0.080  0.600 0.113  6.673    0.083* 
 Column 0.093  0.333  0.100  0.473  1.161  0.762 
8 Row  0.273  0.047  0.507 0.173  3.640  0.303 
 Column 0.113  0.347  0.107  0.433  0.670  0.880 
9 Row  0.233  0.073  0.560 0.133  2.508  0.474 
 Column 0.113  0.353  0.093  0.440  1.134  0.769 
10 Row  0.247  0.067  0.560  0.127  2.051  0.562 
 Column 0.093  0.387  0.100  0.420  0.617  0.892 
11 Row  0.260  0.093  0.513  0.133  1.018  0.797 
 Column  0.107  0.373  0.120  0.400 0.683  0.877 
12 Row  0.327  0.100  0.493  0.080  5.132  0.162 
 Column 0.073  0.407  0.107  0.413  1.857  0.603 
13 Row  0.287  0.080  0.480  0.153  0.657  0.883 
 Column 0.100  0.373  0.133  0.393  1.112  0.774 
14 Row  0.247  0.080  0.553  0.120  1.843  0.606 
 Column 0.080  0.367  0.120  0.433  0.426  0.935 
15 Row  0.260  0.080  0.533  0.127  0.743  0.863 
 Column 0.093  0.460  0.113  0.333  7.563    0.056* 
16 Row  0.253  0.067  0.553  0.127  1.578  0.664 
 Column 0.073  0.400  0.120  0.407  1.687  0.640 
17 Row  0.253  0.093  0.540  0.113  2.043  0.564 
 Column 0.120  0.347  0.087  0.447  2.119  0.548 
18 Row  0.253  0.073  0.533  0.140  0.950  0.813 
 Column 0.087  0.353  0.127  0.433  0.337  0.953 
19 Row  0.260  0.067  0.527  0.147  0.942  0.815 
 Column 0.073  0.367  0.140  0.420  1.696  0.638 
20 Row  0.260  0.067  0.553  0.120  1.509  0.680 
 Column 0.093  0.367  0.093  0.447  0.671  0.880 
 
Notes: ** and * denote rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
Table A5 
Runs Tests in Penalty Kick’s Experiment 
for Professional Players 
 
     Choices  Runs      




1 Row 102  48  72  0.840  0.877 
   Column  82  68  69  0.129  0.167 
2 Row  96  54  74  0.727  0.779 
 Column 93  57  72  0.488  0.554 
3 Row 104  46  64  0.404  0.469 
   Column  86  64  82  0.884  0.913 
4 Row 101  49  69  0.604  0.682 
 Column 81  69  75  0.433  0.499 
5  Row  101  49  79    0.985**  0.992 
   Column  76  74  80  0.717  0.770 
6 Row  99  51  74  0.830  0.869 
  Column  78  72  89    0.981**  0.987 
7  Row  107 43  53  0.025   0.041* 
   Column  86  64  72  0.315  0.375 
8 Row 102  48  69  0.655  0.730 
 Column 81  69  69  0.124  0.160 
9 Row 104  46  63  0.323  0.404 
   Column  80  70  67  0.066  0.089 
10 Row  103  47  58  0.065  0.089 
 Column 78  72  85  0.922  0.943 
11 Row  97  53  66  0.235  0.289 
   Column  78  72  69  0.113  0.147 
12 Row  86  64  68  0.125  0.162 
 Column 78  72  77  0.541  0.605 
13 Row  95  55  71  0.484  0.559 
   Column  79  71  80  0.729  0.781 
14 Row  101  49  72  0.802  0.845 
 Column 83  67  63  0.018    0.027* 
15 Row  99  51  68  0.441  0.507 
   Column  67  83  68  0.103  0.135 
16 Row  102  48  67  0.509  0.592 
 Column 79  71  74  0.353  0.416 
17 Row  98  52  71  0.605  0.679 
   Column  80  70  72  0.246  0.301 
18 Row  101  49  62  0.156  0.199 
 Column 84  66  71  0.231  0.285 
19 Row  101  49  68  0.539  0.604 
   Column  84  66  78  0.666  0.724 
20 Row  101  49  75  0.918  0.947 
   Column  81  69  71  0.204  0.254 
 
Notes: ** and * denote rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.Table A6 
 
Results of Significance Tests from Logit Equations for the Choice of Choice of Right (R) 
for Professional Players 
 
Estimating Equation:  R  =  G [β1 + β2 lag(R) + β3 lag(R) lag(W) + β4 lag(L) lag(W) + β5 lag(R*) + β6 R*] 
 
 
       
Null Hypothesis                        Player Pairs Whose Behavior Allows Rejection of the Null Hypothesis at the:          
 
              5   p e r c e n t   l e v e l          10 percent level    
 
(1).  β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = 0   R o w :      -    1 1      
       C o l u m n :    3 , 8    3 , 6 , 8       
      
(2).  β2 =  0      R o w :      5    5 , 7     
       C o l u m n :    5    3 , 5 , 1 1  
  
(3).  β3 =  0      R o w :      -    -  
       C o l u m n :    -    5  
 
(4).  β4 =  0      R o w :      1 1    1 1  
       C o l u m n :    3    3 , 9  
 
(5).  β5 =  0      R o w :      1 7    1 7  
       C o l u m n :    8 , 1 7    8 , 6 , 1 7  
 
(6).  β6 = 0     R o w :      8    8  
       C o l u m n :    -    -  
 
Notes: The symbols R and R* denote the choice of “right” by a player and by his opponent respectively. The symbol W denotes “win” by a player. The 
term “lag” refers to the previous choice or outcome in the ordered sequence. The function G[x] denotes the function exp(x)/[1+exp(x)]. Rejections are 
based on likelihood-ratio tests. Table B1 
 
Relative Frequencies of Choices and Win Percentages 





          
         Column  Player     
           Choice      Marginal 
         Frequencies  for 
   L  R    Row  Player: 
  L  0.168 0.233      0.401 
     (0.165) (0.198)      (0.364) 
Row     [0.0068] [0.0073]      [0.0088] 
Player            
Choice R  0.228 0.370      0.599 
     (0.289) (0.347)      (0.636) 
     [0.0083] [0.0087]      [0.0088] 
            
      Marginal  0.397 0.603     
Frequencies for  (0.455) (0.545)     
Column Player:  [0.009] [0.009]     
 
 
B. Win Percentages  
    
Observed Row Player Win Percentage:  0.7877
Minimax Row Player Win Percentage:  0.7909





Notes: Numbers in parentheses represent Minimax predicted relative frequencies.  
Numbers in brackets represent standard deviations for observed relative frequencies  
under the Minimax hypothesis. In Panel B, Minimax Row Player Win Percentage  
and Std. Deviation are the mean and the std. deviation of the observed row player  



































Notes:  ** and * denote rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively of the Minimax binomial model for the marginal frequencies  
of the row and column players. In the last column they denote rejections of the joint hypothesis that both players in a pair choose actions  











L  LL LR RL  RR  χ
2  p-value 
1  0.360    0.387*  0.147  0.213  0.240  0.400  0.399 
2   0.427*    0.387*  0.160  0.267  0.227  0.347  0.134 
3   0.427*    0.387*  0.160  0.267  0.227  0.347  0.134 
4   0.427*   0.433  0.173  0.253  0.260  0.313  0.350 
5  0.413    0.387*  0.167  0.247  0.220  0.367  0.220 
6  0.413    0.387*  0.147  0.267  0.240  0.347  0.164 
7    0.427*   0.407  0.207  0.220  0.200  0.373    0.096* 
8  0.407    0.387*  0.140  0.267  0.247  0.347  0.168 
9    0.427*  0.393  0.187  0.240  0.207  0.367  0.143 
10  0.380     0.367**  0.133  0.247  0.233  0.387  0.172 
11    0.427*   0.480  0.167  0.260  0.313  0.260    0.091* 
12  0.420   0.400  0.213  0.207  0.187  0.393     0.036** 
13    0.427*   0.393  0.233  0.193  0.160  0.413     0.002** 
14     0.287**   0.460  0.140  0.147  0.320  0.393  0.260 
15     0.220**   0.440  0.100  0.120  0.340  0.440     0.004** 
16     0.460**      0.300**  0.120  0.340  0.180  0.360     0.000** 
17    0.427*      0.367**  0.160  0.267  0.207  0.367   0.064* 
18  0.407     0.387*  0.153  0.253  0.233  0.360  0.250 
19    0.427*   0.393  0.233  0.193  0.160  0.413     0.002** 




Observed and Expected Win Percentages under the Independence Hypothesis 
for College Students 
 
   Observed   Expected  Mixture  Correlated 
Pair #   Row Win %  Row Win %  Effect  Play Effect 
1  0.8333 0.7908  -0.0001  0.0426 
2  0.7867 0.7933  0.0024  -0.0066 
3  0.7867 0.7933  0.0024  -0.0066 
4  0.7867 0.7916  0.0007  -0.0050 
5  0.7333 0.7928  0.0019  -0.0594 
6  0.8200 0.7928  0.0019  0.0272 
7  0.7733 0.7926  0.0017  -0.0192 
8  0.7933 0.7925  0.0016  0.0008 
9  0.7733 0.7930  0.0021  -0.0197 
10  0.8000 0.7917  0.0008  0.0083 
11  0.8467 0.7900  -0.0009  0.0566 
12  0.7267 0.7926  0.0017  -0.0659 
13  0.7267 0.7930  0.0021  -0.0664 
14  0.8067 0.7911  0.0002  0.0155 
15  0.8133 0.7898  -0.0011  0.0236 
16  0.8200 0.7991  0.0082  0.0209 
17  0.7733 0.7940  0.0030  -0.0206 
18  0.8267 0.7925  0.0016  0.0342 
19  0.7867 0.7930  0.0021  -0.0064 
20  0.7400 0.7928  0.0019  -0.0528 
Mean Absolute Value:  0.0019 0.0279 
Chi-Square Statistic:     0.1139 22.3481 
Chi-Square Probability Value:     0.9999 0.3219 
 
Notes: Expected winning percentages assume independent play with mixtures observed over all 150 
games for each pair. Mixture effects are defined as the difference between the values in column 2 and 
0.7909. Correlation effects are defined as the difference between columns 1 and 2. Table B4 - Testing that College Students Equate  
their Strategies’ Payoffs to the Equilibrium Rates 
 
          
   L  R  Pearson   
Pair #  Player  Success  Fail  Success Fail  statistic  p-value 
1 Row 0.313 0.047  0.520  0.120  2.322  0.508 
   Column  0.053  0.333  0.113  0.500  4.668  0.198 
2 Row 0.360 0.067  0.427  0.147  4.866  0.182 
 Column 0.107  0.280 0.107 0.507  4.892  0.180 
3 Row 0.353 0.073  0.433  0.140  3.781  0.286 
   Column  0.060  0.327  0.153  0.460  4.702  0.195 
4 Row 0.360 0.067  0.427  0.147  4.866  0.182 
 Column 0.093  0.340 0.120 0.447  0.291  0.962 
5 Row 0.293 0.120  0.440  0.147  5.234  0.155 
 Column 0.120  0.267 0.147 0.467  6.411    0.093* 
6 Row 0.367 0.047  0.453  0.133  5.706  0.127 
 Column 0.067  0.320 0.113 0.500  3.559  0.313 
7 Row 0.327 0.100  0.447  0.127  2.931  0.402 
 Column 0.107  0.300 0.120 0.473  2.348  0.503 
8 Row 0.347 0.060  0.447  0.147  3.491  0.322 
 Column 0.053  0.333 0.153 0.460  5.345  0.148 
9 Row 0.340 0.087  0.433  0.140  3.168  0.366 
 Column 0.120  0.273 0.107 0.500  5.789  0.122 
10 Row  0.307  0.073 0.493 0.127  0.280  0.964 
 Column 0.053  0.313 0.147 0.487  6.096  0.107 
11  Row  0.387  0.040  0.460  0.113  8.677      0.034** 
 Column  0.060  0.420  0.093  0.427 4.037  0.257 
12 Row  0.300  0.120 0.427 0.153  6.108  0.106 
  Column  0.140  0.260  0.133  0.467  8.243     0.041** 
13  Row  0.293  0.133  0.433  0.140  8.008     0.046** 
  Column  0.147  0.247  0.127  0.480        10.549     0.014** 
14 Row  0.207  0.080 0.600 0.113  6.673      0.083* 
 Column 0.093  0.367 0.100 0.440  0.311    0.958 
15  Row  0.173  0.047  0.640  0.140        14.135      0.003** 
 Column 0.047  0.393 0.140 0.420  5.102    0.164 
16 Row  0.373  0.087 0.447 0.093  6.791      0.079* 
  Column  0.060  0.240  0.120  0.580        15.620     0.001** 
17 Row  0.320  0.107 0.453 0.120  3.335  0.343 
  Column  0.120  0.247  0.107  0.527  9.523     0.023** 
18 Row  0.367  0.040 0.460 0.133  6.381    0.094* 
 Column 0.060  0.327 0.113 0.500  4.025  0.259 
19 Row  0.347  0.080 0.440 0.133  3.045  0.385 
 Column 0.093  0.300 0.120 0.487  2.590  0.459 
20  Row  0.280  0.140  0.460  0.120  8.854     0.031** 
  Column  0.140  0.253  0.120  0.487  9.002     0.029** 
 
Notes: ** and * denote rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
Table B5 
Runs Tests in Penalty Kick’s Experiment 
for College Students 
 
     Choices  Runs      




1 Row  96  54  69  0.383  0.457 
   Column  92  58  61  0.022  0.033* 
2  Row  86  64  90    0.995**  0.997 
 Column 92  58  70  0.324  0.386 
3 Row  86  64  65  0.049  0.069 
   Column  92  58  91    0.999**  1.000 
4 Row  86  64  77  0.637  0.699 
 Column 85  65  82  0.873  0.904 
5 Row  88  62  78  0.737  0.788 
   Column  92  58  78  0.823  0.863 
6 Row  88  62  72  0.352  0.415 
 Column 92  58  71  0.386  0.456 
7 Row  86  64  65  0.049  0.069 
   Column  89  61  66  0.091  0.121 
8 Row  89  61  84    0.958*  0.971 
  Column  92  58  58  0.006    0.009** 
9 Row  86  64  79  0.754  0.804 
   Column  91  59  80  0.883  0.913 
10 Row  93  57  82    0.958*  0.970 
 Column 95  55  66  0.182  0.229 
11 Row  86  64  76  0.574  0.637 
   Column  78  72  69  0.113  0.147 
12 Row  87  63  63  0.026    0.038* 
  Column  90  60  85     0.976**  0.984 
13 Row  86  64  68  0.125  0.162 
   Column  91  59  88     0.995**  0.997 
14  Row  107  43  82    0.999**  0.999 
 Column 81  69  66  0.049  0.068 
15  Row  117  33  67    0.999**  0.999 
   Column  84  66  82  0.863  0.896 
16 Row  81  69  73  0.309  0.369 
 Column  105  45  70  0.863  0.896 
17 Row  86  64  74  0.441  0.507 
   Column  95  55  69  0.348  0.419 
18 Row  89  61  84    0.958*  0.971 
 Column 92  58  83    0.963*  0.976 
19 Row  86  64  76  0.574  0.637 
   Column  91  59  76  0.692  0.747 
20 Row  87  63  72  0.332  0.394 
   Column  91  59  81  0.913  0.938 
Notes: ** and * denote rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.Table B6 
 
Results of Significance Tests from Logit Equations for the Choice of Choice of Right (R) 
for College Students 
 
Estimating Equation:  R  =  G [β1 + β2 lag(R) + β3 lag(R) lag(W) + β4 lag(L) lag(W) + β5 lag(R*) + β6 R*] 
 
 
       
Null Hypothesis                   Player Pairs Whose Behavior Allows Rejection of the Null Hypothesis at the:                 
 
                     5   p e r c e n t   l e v e l              10 percent level   
(1).  β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = 0  Row:    11,12,13,14,15,19,20    2,11,12,13,14,15,19,20 
    Column:  3,9,12,13,20     3,9,12,13,19,20 
     
(2).  β2 =  0    Row:    2,3,10,14,15     2,3,7,10,14,15 
    C o l u m n :   1 3       1 3 , 2 0  
  
(3).  β3 =  0     R o w :     1 2       1 2  
    C o l u m n :   -       -  
 
(4).  β4 =  0     R o w :     -       6  
    C o l u m n :   9 , 1 3       4 , 9 , 1 3 , 2 0      
 
(5).  β5 =  0    Row:    11,13      1,9,11,13 
    C o l u m n :   1 7       1 1 , 1 7 , 1 8  
 
(6).  β6 = 0    Row:    12,13,19,20     7,11,12,13,19,20 
    Column:  12,13      7,11,12,13,19,20 
 
Notes: The symbols R and R* denote the choice of “right” by a player and by his opponent respectively. The symbol W denotes “win.” The term “lag” 
refers to the previous choice or outcome in the ordered sequence. The function G[x] denotes the function exp(x)/[1+exp(x)]. Rejections are based on 
likelihood-ratio tests. Table C1 
 





A. Frequencies  
 
Column Player Choice            Marginal Frequencies 
            f o r  
   1  2  3  J   Row  Player: 
  1  0.037  0.042 0.039 0.083    0.201 
    (0.040)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.080)   (0.200) 
    [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]    [0.006] 
  2  0.042  0.038 0.044 0.079    0.203 
Row   (0.040)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.080)   (0.200) 
Player   [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]    [0.006] 
Choice               
  3  0.038  0.037 0.040 0.083    0.198 
    (0.040)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.080)   (0.200) 
    [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]    [0.006] 
  J  0.084  0.082 0.081 0.153    0.398 
    (0.080)  (0.080) (0.080) (0.160)   (0.400) 
    [0.004] [0.004]  [0.004]    [0.006]    [0.008] 
Marginal 
Frequencies  0.200  0.198 0.204 0.398     
For Column  (0.200)  (0.200) (0.200) (0.400)    
Player:    [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006] [0.008]     
            
 
B. Win Percentages  
   Observed Row Player Win Percentage:  0.3945 
   Minimax Row Player Win Percentage:  0.4000 
   Minimax Row Player Win Std. Deviation:  0.0077 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: In Panel A, numbers in parentheses represent Minimax predicted relative frequencies, and 
numbers in brackets represent standard deviations for observed relative frequencies under the 
Minimax hypothesis. In Panel B, Minimax Row Player Win Percentage and Std. Deviation are the 
mean and the std. deviation of the observed row player mean percentage win under the Minimax 
hypothesis. Table C2 
Relative Frequencies of Card Choices in O’Neill’s Experiment by Player Pair 
Professional Players 
 
Notes: The pairs of capital letters denote rejection of the Minimax binomial model for a given card (1,2,3,J) for a player (R,C). 
a denotes rejection of Minimax multinomial model for all cards chosen by the row player based on Pearson statistic and χ
2(3). 
b denotes rejection of Minimax multinomial model for all cards chosen by the column player based on Pearson statistic and χ
2(3). 
c denotes rejection of Minimax multinomial model for all cards chosen by both players based on Pearson statistic and χ
2(6). 
 
Row Player (R) Choice   Column Player (C) Choice 
 Rejection of      
Minimax models 
Pair #  1 2 3 J  1 2 3 J  at 5%:   at 10%: 
1  0.190 0.225 0.290 0.295 0.195 0.185 0.210 0.410 a,c,R3,RJ a,c,R3,RJ 
2  0.205 0.215 0.245 0.335 0.200 0.205 0.250 0.345  RJ  R3,RJ,C3,CJ 
3  0.210 0.195 0.200 0.395 0.195 0.175 0.205 0.425       
4  0.215 0.205 0.180 0.400 0.145 0.185 0.225 0.445  C1  C1 
5  0.180 0.195 0.205 0.420 0.200 0.195 0.210 0.395       
6  0.210 0.205 0.185 0.400 0.205 0.185 0.205 0.405       
7  0.215 0.215 0.130 0.440 0.205 0.190 0.205 0.400  R3  R3 
8  0.195 0.215 0.195 0.395 0.225 0.150 0.205 0.420    C2 
9  0.185 0.195 0.215 0.405 0.205 0.180 0.205 0.410       
10  0.175 0.180 0.170 0.475 0.195 0.195 0.215 0.395  RJ  RJ 
11  0.205 0.190 0.170 0.435 0.250 0.200 0.205 0.345    C1,CJ 
12  0.200 0.200 0.195 0.405 0.195 0.200 0.205 0.400       
13  0.215 0.185 0.195 0.405 0.195 0.215 0.190 0.400       
14  0.185 0.185 0.205 0.425 0.205 0.290 0.195 0.310 b,c,C2,CJ b,c,C2,CJ 
15  0.215 0.200 0.170 0.415 0.210 0.185 0.200 0.405       
16  0.205 0.195 0.195 0.405 0.195 0.165 0.175 0.465    CJ 
17  0.205 0.230 0.190 0.375 0.225 0.215 0.205 0.355       
18  0.210 0.195 0.180 0.415 0.205 0.245 0.210 0.340    C2,CJ 
19  0.205 0.220 0.235 0.340 0.170 0.205 0.175 0.450    RJ 





Observed and Expected Win Percentages under the Independence Hypothesis 
 
 
   Observed   Expected  Mixture  Correlated 
Pair #   Row Win %  Row Win %  Effect  Play Effect 
1  0.3400 0.3973  -0.0027  -0.0573 
2  0.3450 0.4048  0.0048  -0.0598 
3  0.3950 0.3997  -0.0003  -0.0047 
4  0.4150 0.4014  0.0014  0.0136 
5  0.4000 0.3997  -0.0003  0.0003 
6  0.4000 0.4001  0.0001  -0.0001 
7  0.4000 0.4004  0.0004  -0.0004 
8  0.4050 0.4007  0.0007  0.0043 
9  0.4000 0.4000  0.0000  0.0000 
10  0.3900 0.3995  -0.0005  -0.0095 
11  0.4100 0.3961  -0.0040  0.0140 
12  0.4050 0.4000  0.0000  0.0050 
13  0.4000 0.4003  0.0003  -0.0003 
14  0.4200 0.3970  -0.0031  0.0231 
15  0.3900 0.4000  0.0000  -0.0100 
16  0.3950 0.4004  0.0004  -0.0054 
17  0.3900 0.4017  0.0017  -0.0117 
18  0.4050 0.3986  -0.0014  0.0064 
19  0.3950 0.3949  -0.0051  0.0001 
20  0.3900 0.3996  -0.0004  -0.0096 
Mean Absolute Value:  0.0014 0.0118 
Chi-Square Statistic:      0.0747  6.9422 
Chi-Square Probability Value:      0.9999  0.9969 
 
Notes: Expected winning percentages assume independent play with mixtures observed over all 200 
games for each pair. Mixture effects are defined as the difference between the values in column 2 and 
0.40. Correlation effects are defined as the difference between columns 1 and 2. 
 
 
 Table C4 - Testing that Professional Players Equate  
their Strategies’ Payoffs to the Equilibrium Rates 
 
   Mixtures  Win  Rates     
Pair #  Player  Joker  Non-Joker  Joker Non-Joker  Pearson  p-value 
1  R  0.295  0.705  0.407  0.312  14.535        0.002** ‡
    C  0.410 0.590 0.707 0.627  4.472  0.215 
2  R  0.335  0.665  0.403  0.316  7.878       0.049** ‡
  C  0.345 0.655 0.609 0.679  6.295    0.098*   
3  R  0.395 0.605 0.367 0.413  0.462  0.927 
    C  0.425 0.575 0.659 0.565  2.378  0.498 
4  R  0.400 0.600 0.388 0.433  0.608  0.895 
  C  0.445  0.555  0.652  0.532  4.795        0.187    †
5  R  0.420 0.580 0.429 0.379  0.833  0.841 
  C  0.395 0.605 0.544 0.636  1.701  0.637 
6  R  0.400 0.600 0.388 0.408  0.087  0.993 
  C  0.405 0.595 0.617 0.588  0.191  0.979 
7  R  0.440 0.560 0.352 0.438  2.865  0.413 
  C  0.400 0.600 0.613 0.592  0.087  0.993 
8  R  0.395 0.605 0.456 0.372  1.431  0.698 
  C  0.420 0.580 0.571 0.612  0.701  0.873 
9  R  0.405 0.595 0.358 0.429  1.024  0.795 
  C  0.410 0.590 0.646 0.568  1.337  0.720 
10  R  0.475 0.525 0.358 0.419  5.660  0.129 
  C  0.395 0.605 0.570 0.636  0.993  0.803 
11  R  0.435 0.565 0.368 0.442  2.229  0.526 
  C  0.345 0.655 0.536 0.618  3.729  0.292 
12  R  0.405 0.595 0.383 0.420  0.323  0.956 
  C  0.400 0.600 0.613 0.583  0.191  0.979 
13  R  0.405 0.595 0.420 0.387  0.243  0.970 
  C  0.400 0.600 0.575 0.617  0.347  0.951 
14  R  0.425 0.575 0.353 0.470  3.576  0.311 
  C  0.310  0.690  0.516  0.609  8.208        0.042** ‡
15  R  0.415 0.585 0.373 0.402  0.441  0.932 
  C  0.405 0.595 0.617 0.605  0.135  0.987 
16  R  0.405 0.595 0.420 0.378  0.389  0.943 
  C  0.465 0.535 0.634 0.579  4.222  0.238 
17  R  0.375 0.625 0.387 0.392  0.608  0.895 
  C  0.355 0.645 0.592 0.620  1.941  0.585 
18  R  0.415 0.585 0.301 0.479  6.628    0.085* 
  C  0.340 0.660 0.632 0.576  3.608  0.307 
19  R  0.340 0.660 0.412 0.386  3.146  0.370 
  C  0.450 0.550 0.689 0.536  7.118    0.068* 
20  R  0.395 0.605 0.367 0.405  0.385  0.943 
  C  0.430 0.570 0.663 0.570  2.670  0.445 
 
Notes:    ** and * denote rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  ‡ and † denote the 
players for whom rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels of the tests of equality of winning proba-
bilities to the equilibrium rate are also found when the four cards are treated individually. 
Table C5  
Runs Tests in O’Neill’s Experiment 
Professional Players 
 
     Choices  Runs      




1 R  59  141 90 0.821  0.856 
   C  82  118  88  0.067  0.087 
2 R  67  133 94 0.707  0.754 
 C 69  131  92  0.508  0.564 
3 R  79  121 90 0.147  0.182 
   C  85  115  100  0.543  0.599 
4 R  80  120 98 0.530  0.586 
  C  89  111  115    0.983**  0.988 
5 R  84  116 94 0.236  0.283 
   C  79  121  96  0.436  0.493 
6 R  80  120  110    0.968*  0.977 
 C 81  119  95  0.334  0.391 
7 R  88  112 89 0.056  0.074 
   C  80  120  100  0.644  0.696 
8 R  79  121 94 0.324  0.377 
 C 84  116  102  0.672  0.722 
9 R  81  119  103  0.773  0.816 
   C  82  118  91  0.143  0.180 
10 R  95  105 98  0.322  0.375 
 C 79  121  98  0.554  0.610 
11 R  87  113 107 0.850  0.882 
   C  69  131  97  0.786  0.833 
12 R  81  119 91  0.155  0.194 
 C 80  120  100  0.644  0.696 
13 R  81  119 93  0.235  0.284 
   C  80  120  93  0.252  0.303 
14 R  85  115 89  0.068  0.090 
 C 62  138  87  0.488  0.563 
15 R  83  117 101 0.635  0.690 
   C  81  119  99  0.563  0.622 
16  R  81  119  114     0.992**  0.994 
 C 93  107  108  0.840  0.873 
17 R  75  125 97  0.601  0.662 
   C  71  129  101  0.889  0.918 
18 R  83  117 98  0.465  0.521 
 C 68  132  78  0.019    0.027* 
19 R  68  132 90  0.422  0.478 
   C  90  110  96  0.260  0.308 
20 R  79  121 96  0.436  0.493 
   C  86  114  90  0.084  0.108 
 
Notes: ** and * denote rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.Table C6 
 
Results of Significance Tests from Logit Equations for the Choice of a Joker Card 
Professional Players 
 
Estimating Equation:  J  =  G[a0 + a1lag(J) + a2lag2(J) + b0J* + b1lag(J*) + b2lag2(J*) + c1lag (J)lag(J*) + c2lag2(J*)lag2(J)] 
 
 
       
Null Hypothesis                               Player Pairs Whose Behavior Allows Rejection of the Null Hypothesis at:          
 
                           5   p e r c e n t   l e v e l              10 percent level  
(1).  a1 = a2 = b0 = b1 = b2 = c1= c2  =  0  Row:    2,5,10,14   2,5,10,11,14 
       C o l u m n :   2 , 1 6     2 , 1 6  
       
(2).  a1 = a2  =  0     Row:    1,2,5    1,2,3,5,8,14,17 
       C o l u m n :   2 , 9 , 1 6     2 , 9 , 1 6  
  
(3).  b1 = b2 = c1= c2  =  0    Row:    2,11,17    2,10,11,17 
       C o l u m n :   2     2 , 1 3 , 1 8  
 
(4).  c1= c2  =   0      R o w :     2 , 1 1     2 , 1 1 , 1 8  
       C o l u m n :   2     2 , 1 3  
 
(5).  b1 = b2 =    0     Row:    2,11,13    2,11,13 
       C o l u m n :   -     -  
 
(6).  b0  =   0      R o w :     -     -  
       C o l u m n :   -     -  
 
 
Notes: The symbols J and J* denote the choice of a joker card by a player and by his opponent respectively. The terms “lag” and “lag2” refer to the 
strategies previously followed in the ordered sequence. The function G[x] denotes the function exp(x)/[1+exp(x)]. Rejections are based on likelihood-
ratio tests. Table D1 
 





A. Frequencies  
Column Player Choice                 Marginal Frequencies 
            f o r  
   1  2  3  J   Row  Player: 
  1  0.045  0.042 0.040 0.079      0.205 
    (0.040)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.080)    (0.200) 
    [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]    [0.006] 
  2  0.044  0.046 0.038 0.080      0.207 
Row   (0.040)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.080)    (0.200) 
Player   [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]    [0.006] 
Choice              
  3  0.042  0.034 0.046 0.075      0.196 
    (0.040)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.080)    (0.200) 
    [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]    [0.006] 
  J  0.076  0.084 0.078 0.154      0.392 
    (0.080)  (0.080) (0.080) (0.160)    (0.400) 
    [0.004]  [0.004] [0.004] [0.006]    [0.008] 
Marginal 
Frequencies  0.206  0.205 0.202 0.387       
For Column  (0.200)  (0.200) (0.200) (0.400)     
Player:   [0.006]  0.006  [0.006]  [0.008]     
            
 
 
B. Win Percentages  
   Observed Row Player Win Percentage:  0.3915 
   Minimax Row Player Win Percentage:  0.4000 
   Minimax Row Player Win Std. Deviation:  0.0077 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: In Panel A, numbers in parentheses represent Minimax predicted relative frequencies, and 
numbers in brackets represent standard deviations for observed relative frequencies under the 
Minimax hypothesis. In Panel B, Minimax Row Player Win Percentage and Std. Deviation are the 




 Table D2 




Notes: The pairs of capital letters denote rejection of the Minimax binomial model for a given card (1,2,3,J) for a player (R,C). 
a denotes rejection of Minimax multinomial model for all cards chosen by the row player based on Pearson statistic and χ
2(3). 
b denotes rejection of Minimax multinomial model for all cards chosen by the column player based on Pearson statistic and χ
2(3). 
c denotes rejection of Minimax multinomial model for all cards chosen by both players based on Pearson statistic and χ
2(6). 
 
Row Player (R) Choice   Column Player (C) Choice 
 Rejection of      
Minimax models 
Pair #  1 2  3  J  1 2  3  J  at 5%:   at 10%: 
1  0.225 0.270  0.195  0.310  0.140 0.205 0.260  0.395  a,c,R2,RJ,C1,C3 a,b,c,R2,RJ,C1,C3 
2  0.205 0.180  0.160  0.455  0.185 0.205 0.210  0.400    RJ 
3  0.200  0.205 0.215 0.380 0.230  0.190 0.225  0.355       
4  0.145  0.215 0.155 0.485 0.175  0.180 0.225  0.420 a,R1,RJ  a,c,R1,R3,RJ 
5  0.135 0.190  0.235  0.440  0.195 0.175 0.195  0.435  R1  a,R1 
6  0.185 0.215  0.235  0.365  0.215 0.230 0.230  0.325  CJ  CJ 
7  0.230 0.185  0.215  0.370  0.200 0.150 0.165  0.485  CJ  b,C2,CJ 
8  0.195  0.225 0.165 0.415 0.185  0.225 0.185  0.405       
9  0.150 0.215  0.200  0.435  0.200 0.215 0.195  0.390    R1 
10  0.280 0.260  0.200  0.260  0.250 0.185 0.210  0.355  a,c,R1,R2,RJ a,c,R1,R2,RJ,C1 
11  0.195 0.175  0.180  0.450  0.225 0.260  0.205 0.310  b,C2,CJ  b,C2,CJ 
12  0.280  0.210 0.180 0.330 0.215  0.220 0.175 0.390  a,R1,RJ  a,c,R1,RJ 
13  0.175  0.195 0.195 0.435 0.200  0.200 0.210  0.390       
14  0.170 0.230  0.260  0.340  0.195 0.195 0.205  0.405  R3  a,R3,RJ 
15  0.140 0.210  0.200  0.450  0.195 0.205 0.200  0.400  R1  R1 
16  0.245 0.195  0.190  0.370  0.225 0.215 0.160  0.400    R1 
17  0.195  0.160 0.200 0.445 0.210  0.205 0.200  0.385       
18  0.265 0.210  0.185  0.340  0.215 0.205 0.180  0.400  R1  a,R1,RJ 
19  0.300 0.185  0.190  0.325  0.255 0.240  0.195 0.310  a,b,c,R1,RJ,C1,CJ a,b,c,R1,RJ,C1,CJ 






Observed and Expected Win Percentages under the Independence Hypothesis 
 
   Observed   Expected  Mixture  Correlated 
Pair #   Row Win %  Row Win %  Effect  Play Effect 
1  0.3600 0.4024  0.0024  -0.0424 
2  0.3750 0.4006  0.0006  -0.0256 
3  0.3750 0.4015  0.0015  -0.0265 
4  0.3900 0.4035  0.0034  -0.0135 
5  0.4250 0.4024  0.0024  0.0226 
6  0.4150 0.4040  0.0040  0.0110 
7  0.4000 0.3947  -0.0053  0.0053 
8  0.4400 0.3989  -0.0011  0.0411 
9  0.3700 0.3991  -0.0009  -0.0291 
10  0.3850 0.4095  0.0095  -0.0245 
11  0.4000 0.3927  -0.0073  0.0073 
12  0.4000 0.3995  -0.0005  0.0005 
13  0.4000 0.3994  -0.0007  0.0007 
14  0.3900 0.3991  -0.0009  -0.0091 
15  0.3500 0.3997  -0.0003  -0.0497 
16  0.4000 0.3986  -0.0015  0.0015 
17  0.3650 0.3989  -0.0011  -0.0339 
18  0.3400 0.3987  -0.0013  -0.0587 
19  0.4900 0.4086  0.0085  0.0815 
20  0.3600 0.3992  -0.0008  -0.0392 
Mean Absolute Value:  0.0027 0.0262 
Chi-Square Statistic:     0.2462 18.7426 
Chi-Square Probability Value:     0.9999 0.5386 
 
Notes: Expected winning percentages assume independent play with mixtures observed over all 200 
games for each pair. Mixture effects are defined as the difference between the values in column 2 and 






 Table D4 – Testing that College Students Equate  
their Strategies’ Payoffs to the Equilibrium Rates 
 
   Mixtures  Win  Rates     
Pair #  Player  Joker  Non-Joker  Joker Non-Joker  Pearson  p-value 
1  R  0.310  0.690  0.371  0.355  8.253       0.041** ‡
   C  0.395  0.605  0.709  0.595  3.885       0.274   †
2  R  0.455 0.545 0.352 0.394  3.542  0.315 
  C  0.400 0.600 0.600 0.642  0.868  0.833 
3  R  0.380 0.620 0.382 0.371  0.885  0.829 
    C  0.355 0.645 0.592 0.643  2.795  0.424 
4  R  0.485 0.515 0.351 0.427  7.493    0.058* 
  C  0.420 0.580 0.595 0.621  0.542  0.910 
5  R  0.440 0.560 0.375 0.464  3.385  0.336 
  C  0.435 0.565 0.621 0.540  2.795  0.424 
6  R  0.365 0.635 0.438 0.402  1.431  0.698 
  C  0.325 0.675 0.508 0.622  6.875    0.076* 
7  R  0.370 0.630 0.432 0.381  1.250  0.741 
  C  0.485 0.515 0.670 0.534  10.035      0.018** 
8  R  0.415 0.585 0.349 0.504  6.274    0.099* 
  C  0.405 0.595 0.642 0.504  5.135  0.162 
9  R  0.435 0.565 0.425 0.327  3.608  0.307 
  C  0.390 0.610 0.526 0.697  6.670    0.083* 
10  R  0.260  0.740  0.558  0.324            24.195        0.000** ‡
  C  0.355 0.645 0.592 0.628  2.156  0.541 
11  R  0.450  0.550  0.311  0.473  7.639       0.054*  †
  C  0.310 0.690 0.548 0.623  7.639    0.054* 
12  R  0.330  0.670  0.515  0.343  9.097       0.028*  †
  C  0.390 0.610 0.564 0.623  0.764  0.858 
13  R  0.435 0.565 0.391 0.407  1.076  0.783 
  C  0.390 0.610 0.564 0.623  0.764  0.858 
14  R  0.340 0.660 0.324 0.424  4.764  0.190 
  C  0.405 0.595 0.728 0.529  8.104      0.044* 
15  R  0.450 0.550 0.389 0.318  4.948  0.176 
  C  0.400 0.600 0.563 0.708  6.337      0.096* 
16  R  0.370 0.630 0.473 0.357  3.281  0.350 
  C  0.400 0.600 0.563 0.625  0.781  0.854 
17  R  0.445 0.555 0.371 0.360  2.712  0.438 
  C  0.385 0.615 0.571 0.675  3.378  0.337 
18  R  0.340  0.660  0.368  0.326  6.587       0.086*  ‡
  C  0.400 0.600 0.688 0.642  3.420  0.331 
19  R  0.325  0.675  0.400  0.533            15.937       0.001** ‡
  C  0.310  0.690  0.581  0.478            16.626       0.001** ‡
20  R  0.435 0.565 0.368 0.354  2.368  0.500 
  C  0.385 0.615 0.584 0.675  3.201  0.362 
 
Notes: ** and * denote rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  ‡ and † denote the 
players for whom rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels of the tests of equality of winning proba-
bilities to the equilibrium rate are also found when the four cards are treated individually. 
 
Table D5 
Runs Tests in O’Neill’s Experiment 
College Students 
 
     Choices  Runs      




1  R  62  138  102    0.995**  0.996 
   C  79  121  92  0.226  0.271 
2 R  91  109 95 0.208  0.251 
 C 80  120  92  0.209  0.252 
3 R  76  124 92 0.287  0.338 
   C  71  129  107     0.985**  0.990 
4 R  97  103 99 0.366  0.421 
  C  84  116  111    0.961*  0.972 
5 R  88  112  103  0.663  0.715 
   C  87  113  131     0.999**  1.000 
6 R  73  127 99 0.766  0.813 
 C 65  135  99  0.942  0.961 
7  R  74  126  112     0.996**  0.997 
   C  97  103  94  0.146  0.182 
8 R  83  117  107  0.889  0.915 
 C 81  119  90  0.123  0.155 
9 R  87  113  102  0.624  0.677 
   C  78  122  96  0.461  0.518 
10 R  52  148 82  0.747  0.790 
 C 71  129  103  0.937  0.956 
11 R  90  110 105 0.740  0.785 
   C  62  138  92  0.796  0.834 
12  R  66  134  114     0.999**  1.000 
 C 78  122  88  0.099  0.126 
13 R  87  113 94  0.201  0.244 
   C  78  122  89  0.126  0.161 
14  R  68  132  72  0.001     0.002** 
 C 81  119  84  0.021    0.029* 
15 R  90  110 93  0.141  0.176 
   C  80  120  112     0.984**  0.989 
16 R  74  126 83  0.037  0.052 
 C 80  120  101  0.696  0.747 
17 R  89  111 112    0.954*  0.966 
   C  77  123  109   0.973*  0.981 
18  R  68  132  104     0.980**  0.986 
 C 80  120  89  0.104  0.135 
19 R  65  135 91  0.605  0.673 
   C  62  138  91  0.737  0.796 
20 R  87  113 107 0.850  0.882 
   C  77  123  98  0.606  0.660 
 
Notes: ** and * denote rejections at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.Table D6 
 
Results of Significance Tests from Logit Equations for the Choice of a Joker Card 
College Students 
 
Estimating Equation:  J  =  G[a0 + a1lag(J) + a2lag2(J) + b0J* + b1lag(J*) + b2lag2(J*) + c1lag (J)lag(J*) + c2lag2(J)lag2(J*)] 
 
 
       
Null Hypothesis                                        Player Pairs Whose Behavior Allows Rejection of the Null Hypothesis at            
 
        5   p e r c e n t   l e v e l     1 0   p e r c e n t   l e v e l    
(1).  a1 = a2 = b0 = b1 = b2 = c1= c2  =  0  Row:    5,10,12     5,7,9,10,12,14,20 
     Column:  5,10,12     4,5,6,10,12,14 
      
 (2).  a1 = a2  =  0     Row:    9,12,15     9,10,12,14,15 
     C o l u m n :   5 , 1 4 , 2 0      4 , 5 , 1 4 , 2 0  
  
(3).  b1 = b2 = c1= c2  =   0     R o w :     -      -  
     C o l u m n :   -      1 0 , 1 2  
 
(4).  c1= c2  =   0      R o w :     -      8 , 9 , 1 5 , 2 0  
     C o l u m n :   -      1 2  
 
(5).  b1 = b2 =     0      R o w :     1 5      1 5  
     C o l u m n :   1 2      1 0 , 1 2  
 
(6).  b0  =  0     Row:    10,12,14   4,10,12,14,16 
     C o l u m n :   6 , 1 0 , 1 4      4 , 6 , 1 0 , 1 4 , 1 6  
 
 
Notes: The symbols J and J* denote the choice of a joker card by a player and by his opponent respectively. The terms “lag” and “lag2” refer to the 
strategies previously followed in the ordered sequence. The function G[x] denotes the function exp(x)/[1+exp(x)]. Rejections are based on likelihood-
ratio tests.  
Table E - Summary Statistics in Penalty Kick’s Experiment 
 
 
       Professional      College Students with 
          Soccer   Soccer        No Soccer  
               Equilibrium       Players         Experience    Experience 
I. Aggregate Data  
   Row Player frequencies   L  0.363   0.333   0.392   0.401 
        R  0.636   0.667   0.608   0.599   
   Column Player frequencies  L  0.454   0.462   0.419   0.397 
        R  0.545   0.538   0.581   0.603 
       
   Row Player Win   percentage   0.7909   0.7947   0.7927   0.7877 
             (std. deviation)          (0.0074) 
 
 
II. Number of Individual Rejections of Minimax Model at 5 (10) percent  
    Binomial Model for Marginal Frequencies 
      All Players         2 (4)     2 (4)      2 (3)      6 (22) 
 
    Multinomial Model for Pair Frequencies  
      All Players          1 (2)     0 (2)      2 (2)      6 (9) 
 
III. Mixture and Correlated Effects  
      Mean Mixture effect Chi-statistic    ---    0.0059    0.0272     0.1139 
p-value         ---   0.9999   0.9999      0.9999 
     Mean Correlated effect Chi-statistic    ---    3.2343    3.8093             22.3481 
p-value       ---   0.9999   0.9999      0.3219 
 
IV. Equality of Success Rates Across Strategies and to the Equilibrium Rate  
     Rejections at 5 (10) percent     2 (4)      0 (3)       2 (2)      9 (13) 
     Aggregate Pearson tests 
  All Row players statistic     ---     40.002     43.294   108.652 
         p-value      ---     0.9781    0.9487   0.000123 
  All Column players statistic    ---     32.486    56.537   113.102 
         p-value      ---     0.9985    0.6030   0.000041 
 
V. Runs tests for 40 players 
   Rejections at 5 (10) percent    2 (4)    2 (4)    3 (5)    7 (13) 
 
VI. Logit Equations at the Player Level for 40 players  
   Rejections of stationary binomial process  




Note: The rejections of the stationary binomial process in Panel VI refer to the joint test that all coefficients other  
than the constant term are equal to zero in the equations specified in section 3.  Table F - Summary Statistics in O’Neill’s Experiment 
 
             Professional     College Students with 
              Soccer          Soccer          No Soccer  
                     Equilibrium         Players        Experience    Experience       O’Neill 
(1) 
     I. Aggregate Data  
             Row Player frequencies   1  0.200   0.201   0.203   0.206   0.221 
        2  0.200   0.203   0.197   0.206     0.215 
     3  0.200   0.198   0.197   0.196   0.203 
     J  0.400   0.398   0.403   0.392   0.362   
             Column Player frequencies   1  0.200   0.200   0.199   0.206   0.226 
        2  0.200   0.198   0.198   0.205   0.179 
     3  0.200   0.204   0.203   0.201   0.169 
     J  0.400   0.398   0.400   0.387   0.426     
              Row Player Win percentage   0.400   0.394   0.403   0.391   0.410 
                   (std. deviation)              (0.007)                       
 
     II. Number of Individual Rejections of Minimax Model at 5 (10) percent  
   Row Player (All Cards)     1  (2)     1  (1)      2  (2)      5  (8)      6 (na) 
   Column Player (All Cards)     1  (2)     1  (1)      2  (2)      2  (4)      9 (na) 
   Both Players (All Cards)     1  (2)     2  (2)      1  (2)      3  (5)      9 (na) 
   All Cards         8 (16)     8 (18)    11 (18)   23 (31)   35 (na) 
 
III. Mixture and Correlated Effects  
      Mean Mixture effect p-value         ---   0.999   0.999   0.999   0.999 
      Mean Correlated effect p-value      ---   0.996   0.999   0.538   0.026 
      
IV. Equality of Success Rates Across Strategies and to the Equilibrium Rate using NJ and J 
(2) 
    A. Using equilibrium frequencies and success probabilities (3 degrees of freedom at individual level)  
    Rejections at 5 (10) percent     2 (4)       3 (6)       3 (6)     5 (15)     22 (25) 
    Aggregate Pearson tests 
All Row players p-value       ---     0.715    0.514    0.000009  6.78·10
-17  
All Column players p-value      ---     0.654   0.959   0.0042     1.90·10
-21  
 
    B. Using maximum likelihood estimates (1 degree of freedom at individual level)  
    Rejections at 5 (10) percent     2 (4)      2 (4)      3 (6)    8 (10)    10 (15) 
    Aggregate Pearson tests 
All Row players p-value       ---     0.404    0.221    0.005    4.93·10
-8  
All Column players p-value      ---     0.298   0.387   0.002     1.45·10
-8  
 
     V. Runs Tests  
      Rejections at 5 (10) percent     2 (4)      2 (4)     3 (5)    7 (12)    15 (19)       
 
VI. Logit Equations for Stationary Binomial Process 
(3)   
       Rejections at 5 (10) percent     ---      6 (7)     4 (9)    6 (13)    31 (na)  
______________________________ 
1. The results for O’Neill come from Brown and Rosenthal (1990) and Walker and Wooders (2001), where “na” means that the 
corresponding estimate was not reported by the authors and may not be computed from the data they report. O’Neill’s (1987) 
experiment involves 25 pairs, rather than 20 pairs, and 105 repetitions instead of 200. Hence, the number of expected rejections  
under Minimax at a given percentage level in the original O’Neill’s experiment is 1.25 greater than those reported in the first  
column, and the std. deviation for observed relative frequencies under Minimax play in Panel I is 0.009, rather than 0.007.  
2. In O’Neill’s original experiment there are two pairs that represent extreme outliers. When these are ignored, the p-values in  
panel A remain very low (1.2·10
-9 and 1.7·10
-12 , respectively). 
3. Rejections refer to the joint test that all coefficients except the constant term are zero in the equations specified in section 3.  